A sound dependency analysis for secure information flow (extended version) by Ghindici, Dorina et al.
A sound dependency analysis for secure information flow
(extended version)
Dorina Ghindici, Isabelle Simplot-Ryl, Jean-Marc Talbot
To cite this version:
Dorina Ghindici, Isabelle Simplot-Ryl, Jean-Marc Talbot. A sound dependency analysis for
secure information flow (extended version). [Research Report] RT-0347, INRIA. 2007. <inria-
00185263v3>
HAL Id: inria-00185263
https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00185263v3
Submitted on 6 Nov 2007
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
appor t  

     t e ch n i qu e 
IS
SN
02
49
-0
80
3
IS
RN
IN
R
IA
/R
T-
-
03
47
--F
R+
EN
G
Thème COM
INSTITUT NATIONAL DE RECHERCHE EN INFORMATIQUE ET EN AUTOMATIQUE
A sound dependency analysis for secure information
flow (extended version)
Dorina Ghindici — Isabelle Simplot-Ryl — Jean-Marc Talbot
N° 0347
October 2007
Unité de recherche INRIA Futurs
Parc Club Orsay Université, ZAC des Vignes,
4, rue Jacques Monod, 91893 ORSAY Cedex (France)
Téléphone : +33 1 72 92 59 00 — Télécopie : +33 1 60 19 66 08
A sound dependency analysis for secure information
flow (extended version)
Dorina Ghindici∗ , Isabelle Simplot-Ryl∗ , Jean-Marc Talbot†
The`me COM — Syste`mes communicants
Projet POPS
Rapport technique n° 0347 — October 2007 — 40 pages
Abstract: In this paper we present a flow-sensitive analysis for secure information
flow for Java bytecode. Our approach consists in computing, at different program
points, a dependency graph which tracks how input values of a method may influence
its outputs. This computation subsumes a points-to analysis (reflecting how objects
depend on each others) by addressing dependencies arising from data of primitive type
and from the control flow of the program. Our graph construction is proved to be sound
by establishing a non-interference theorem stating that an output value is unrelated
with an input one in the dependency graph if the output remains unchanged when the
input is modified. In contrast with many type-based information flow techniques, our
approach does not require security levels to be known during the computation of the
graph: security aspects of information flow are checked by labeling ”a posteriori” the
dependency graph with security levels.
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Une analyse de de´pendence pour le flot d’information
Re´sume´ : Dans ce rapport, nous pre´sentons une analyse de flot d’information pour
le bytecode Java. Notre approche consiste a` calculer, pour diffe´rents points du pro-
gramme, un graphe de de´pendances qui repre´sente l’influence que les valeurs en entre´e
d’une me´thode ont sur les sorties. Ce calcul inclut une analyse de pointeurs (illus-
trant les de´pendances entre objets) a` laquelle sont ajoute´es les de´pendances issues des
donne´es de type primitif et du flot de controˆle du programme. La construction de notre
graphe est prouve´e correcte par un the´oreme de non-interference qui e´nonce qu’une
valeur de sortie n’est pas lie´e a` une valeur d’entre´e dans le graphe de de´pendances si la
valeur de sortie ne change pas lorsque la valeur d’entre´e varie. `A l’inverse de beaucoup
de techniques base´es sur des syste`mes de types, notre approche ne ne´cessite pas de
connaıˆtre la politique de se´curite´ lors du calcul du graphe : le respest d’une politique
de ”se´curite´” en termes de flot d’information sont ve´rifie´s en e´tiquetant ”a posteriori”
le graphe de de´pendances avec des niveaux de se´curite´.
Mots-cle´s : Flot d’information, analyse statique, bytecode Java, interpretation abs-
traite, non-interference
A sound dependency analysis for secure information flow 3
1 Introduction
Information flow analysis [17] detects how data may flow between variables focusing
on data manipulations of primitive types. This analysis is used to check data propaga-
tion in programs with regards to security requirements and aims to avoid that programs
leak confidential information: observable/public outputs of a program must not dis-
close information about secret/confidential values manipulated by the program. Non-
interference defines the absence of illicit information flow by stating that public out-
puts of a program remain unchanged if its secret values are modified. Data is labeled
with security levels, usually high for secret/confidential values and low for observ-
able/public variables. There are information flows arising from assignments (direct
flow) or from the control structure of a program (implicit flow). For example, the code
l=h generates a direct flow from h to l, while if(h)thenl=1elsel=0 gener-
ates an implicit flow. If h has security level high and l low, then the examples are
insecure and generate an illicit information flow, as secret data can be induced by the
reader of l.
In object oriented languages, like Java [14], the analysis of information flow is
related to the analysis of references. Points-to analysis [1] is a static analysis which
computes for every object the set of objects to which it may point to at runtime. Points-
to analysis [18] has been developed for applications such as escape analysis [20] or
optimizations, but never used as part of information flow analysis even if they are
strongly related.
In this paper we propose a sound general flow-sensitive analysis of Java programs
that computes a dependency graph including references and primitive types. The graph
is a points-to graph extended with primitive values and dependencies raised by control
flow. The dependency graph characterizes on one hand how fields of objects point to
other objects, and on the other hand the dependencies between primitive values through
direct or indirect flow, in the sense of non-interference. This leads to an analysis which
is more general than ”traditional” information flow analysis as it computes a depen-
dency graph abstracting the dependencies between program data: a node a is related
to b if the value of b may influence the value of a. These dependencies are not made
explicit in ”traditional” information flow analysis and replaced by coarser flows of se-
curity levels from a a priori fixed security lattice [8]. This approach has been initiated
by the Volpano, Irvine and Smith’s model [19].
In our work, we compute these dependencies between values independently of any
a priori information like security levels. Therefore, when applied to secure informa-
tion flow, our approach allows to reuse the same analysis for various security lattices
without re-analysing the code.
Note that our dependency graph should not be confused with data dependency
graphs such as [7] which represent dependencies among register and memory reads
and write and aim to be used for program slicing.
The language we consider is the Java bytecode language: only few papers [4, 13]
take into consideration low-level languages, while the Java language is rarely spec-
ified. A type-based method for checking secure information flow in Java bytecode
is presented in [6], while in [5] Barthe, Pichardie and Rezk define an information
flow type system for a sequential JVM-like language and prove that it guarantees non-
interference. Some other works [2, 9, 15] use static analysis to treat information flow.
The main weakness of these approaches is that they are flow insensitive. Recently,
Hunt and Sands proposed a family of flow-sensitive type systems [11] for tracking
information flow.
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All the previous cited works require the lattice security model of information flow
to be known from the very beginning of the analysis. We believe that “traditional”
information flow analysis can be recovered as an abstract interpretation of our depen-
dency graphs, this abstract interpretation taking into account the security levels.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 3 presents the concrete model used in
the rest of the paper. Section 4 describes the design and construction of our depen-
dency graph during an intra-method analysis of sequential programs. We present the
correctness of the construction in Section 5, using a non-interference theorem. Sec-
tion 6 describes the inter-procedural analysis and adds support for method invocation.
Section 7 applies the dependency graph to information flow.
2 Notations
We consider finite graphs whose vertices and edges are both labelled. Let V ,L two sets
used respectively as labels for vertices and edges.
A graph G is given by a triple (V, E, ς) where V is its set of vertices (or nodes),
E ⊆ V × V × L is its set of labelled edges and the mapping ς associates a label from
V with each element of V . In a graph G, the edge from vertex u to v, labeled with l is
denoted by (u, v, l), and adj G(u, l) is the set of adjacent vertices of u in G, reached by
an edge labeled by l. Further, G.V denotes its set of vertices and G.E its set of edges;
the mapping G.ς(v) gives the label of the node v. A node u is a leaf in a graph G if for
any node v and label l, (u, v, l) 6∈ G.E.
The union of two graphs G1 ∪ G2 (assuming that for all u in G1.V ∩ G2.V ,
G1.ς(u) = G2.ς(u)) is a graph G3, having G3.V = G1.V ∪ G2.V , G3.E = G1.E ∪
G2.E and G3.ς = G1.ς ∪ G2.ς . A graph G1 is included in a graph G2 (denoted
G1 ⊆ G2) if there exists a subgraph G′2 of G2 which is isomorphic1 to G1.
For two graphs G1, G2, we say that G1 and G2 are similar (denoted G1 ≡ G2)
if there exists a mapping ς : G2.V → V such that for all u in G2.V which is a leaf
G2.ς(u) = ς(u) and G1, (G2.V, G2.E, ς) are isomorphic.
For a graph G, G[u 7→ l] designates the graph that agrees with G but changes the
label of the vertex u to l, while G[(u, f) 7→ v] agrees with G except that all the edges
of the form (u, u′, f) in G.E, are replaced by a unique edge (u, v, l).
A vertex v is reachable from u in a graph G if there is a path (a sequence of edges
leading) from u to v and we denote by ReachG(u) the set of vertices reachable from u
in G. We define Gbuc the subgraph of G given by (ReachG(u), {(v, w, l) | (v, w, l) ∈
G.E and v, w ∈ ReachG(u)}, ς|ReachG(u)).
Finally, for a function f , by f [x 7→ e] we denote the function f ′ such that f ′(y) =
f(y) if y 6= x and f ′(x) = e. For D, a subset of the domain of the function f , f|D is
the restriction of f on D.
3 The Java Virtual Machine model
This section introduces the syntax and the model of the JVM we consider. Due to
limited space, we focus on a general and representative subset of the JVM, depicted
in Figure 1. Most of the rest of the JVM instructions are similar to the ones of this
set (e.g. we give a hint how static variables and arrays can be treated as objects with
1The graph isomorphisms we consider take in consideration both vertex and edge labelling.
INRIA
A sound dependency analysis for secure information flow 5
prim op primitive operation taking two operands, pushing the result on the stack
pop pop the top of the stack
iconst n push the primitive value n on the stack
aconst null push null on the stack
new C creates new object of type C in the memory
goto a jump to address a
ifeq a jump to address a if the top of the stack equals to 0
load x push the content of the local variable x on the stack
store x pop the top of the stack and store it into the local variable x
getfield fC′ load on the stack the field fC′ of the object beeing on the top of the stack
putfield fC′ store the top of the stack in the field fC′ of an object on the stack
invoke mC′ virtual invocation of method mC′
areturn return an object and exit the method
Figure 1: Instruction set
some special fields). We do not address exceptions and threads but take overwritting
into account. We assume the bytecode programs to be well-typed and deal only with
executions that terminate and do not throw exceptions.
We consider a set of class names Class , a set of methods Methods and a set Fields
of fields names. For two classes B, C, B ≤ C if and only if B = C or C is a super
class of B. The function Type : Obj → Class returns the type of an object. The set
of JVM values is defined as Jv = Val ∪ Obj where Val is the set of primitive values,
and Obj the set of objects, including the special value null.
3.1 Memory model
We define the memory as a directed graph. The advantage of this representation is the
independence between objects and actual locations where these objects are allocated.
However, the graph representing the memory is isomorphic to any address assignment
in an execution. This independence property is crucial when comparing memories for
two executions of the same method for different input values.
A node designates a location and is labeled with an element from Jv , representing
the JVM value stored in the location; edges represent field references and are labeled
with field names (from Fields). Nodes containing null or primitive values (from Val )
are leaves.
For a graph G, G.V Obj denotes the nodes labeled by some element from Obj
(G.V Obj = {v ∈ G.V | G.ς(v) ∈ Obj}) while G.V Val denotes the sets of nodes la-
belled by some element from Val . We define by ΠObj(G) the subgraph of G restricted
to objects as (G.V Obj , {(u, v, l) | u, v ∈ G.V Obj and (u, v, l) ∈ G.E}, G.ς|G.V Obj ).
For a memory graph G, G.ς is an injective function associating with each vertex
(location) the JVM value (from Jv ) it contains, each object value being associated with
a unique location. This allows us to make no distinction between a node of G.V Obj and
its label. For l in Obj , we freely use G.ς−1(l) to denote the (unique) vertex labeled by l
in G. Moreover, there exists a unique vertex labelled by null. For each primitive field
of an object, the memory has a location (vertex) containing (labeled with) the value of
the field and this vertex is the target of a unique edge. We consider an allocator function
G′ = new(o, C) which creates a new graph structure for an object named o of type C;
o is labelling the root of the graph. The graph G′ contains the initial values of the new
created object (vartices labeled by 0 for fields of primitive type and edges to null for
fields of type object).
Figure 2(a) shows the result of the allocator function for A11, thus after executing
instruction 1.
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class A {
int f;
B g;
}
class B {
int r;
}
1 : new A
2 : store x
3 : new B
4 : store y
5 : new A
6 : store z
7 : load x
8 : load y
9 : putfield g_A
10: load z
11: load y
12: putfield g_A
13: load x
14: iconst_3
15: putfield f_A
16: load z
17: load x
18: getfield f_A
19: putfield f_A
A11
null 0
g f
(a) After 1
A11A
5
1
3 B31 3
0 null
ff gg
r
(b) After 19
Figure 2: Memory Example
3.2 Operational semantics
For a method m of class C, nm denotes the number of its arguments, χm its set of local
variables, Pm its instruction list; Pm[i] denotes the ith bytecode of the method m. A
(concrete) state of our machine is a pair Q = (fr , G), where fr represents a stack of
frames corresponding to a dynamic chain of method calls (with the current frame on
the top), and G is the memory graph. A frame has the form (pc, ρ, s), where pc ∈ Pm
is the program counter, ρ : χm → Jv represents a value assignment of local variables
and s is a stack with elements in Jv . The operational semantics of Java bytecode is
presented in Figure 3. The concatenation n :: s denotes a stack having n on top, while
fC′ designates the field f of the class C ′.
The bytecode putfield has two rules depending on the type of the manipulated
field: changing the value of a primitive field means changing the label of a vertex,
whereas changing an object field consist in changing the edge to the vertex containing
the new pointed object.
Figure 2(b) shows the memory graph after executing the entire code from Figure 2.
Affecting the object B31 to the field g of A11 (bytecodes 7-9) consists in creating a new
edge labelled by g from A11 to B31, while the assignment of the value 3 to the field f of
A11 (bytecodes 13-15) changes the label of the node reached from A11 with an f-edge.
The intra-method control flow graph CFm of a method m is defined as usual: CFm
is a graph with Pm as set of vertices and edges from i to each elements of succ(i), with
succ(i) given by the bytecode semantics, for each i ∈ Pm as:
• succ(i) = {a} if Pm[i] = goto a,
• succ(i) = {a, i + 1} if Pm[i] = ifeq a,
• succ(i) = ∅ if Pm[i] = areturn,
• succ(i) = {i + 1} otherwise.
We also use the notation pred(i) = {j | i ∈ succ(j)}. An exit-point in a control flow
graph is a node without successor.
For a method m, a block B is a subset of the instruction list Pm together with a
distinguished instruction, called the entry-point of B (Entry(B)) such that the control
flow graph CFB of B is a subgraph of CFm; all vertices in CFB are reachable from
Entry(B) and CFB has a unique exit-point (Exit(B)). We will assume that Pm is itself
a block by adding a unique (fake) exit-point to its control flow graph. A state Q =
((i, ρ, s) :: fr, G) is a good initial state for a block B, if B[i] is defined and executing
the block B starting from the state Q terminates in a state denoted by instrB(Q).
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Pm[i] = prim op n = op(n1, n2)
((i, ρ, n1 :: n2 :: s) :: fr, G) −→ ((i + 1, ρ, n :: s) :: fr, G)
Pm[i] = goto a
F −→ ((a, ρ, s) :: fr, G)
Pm[i] = aconst null
F −→ ((i + 1, ρ, null :: s) :: fr, G)
Pm[i] = pop
((i, ρ, n :: s) :: fr, G) −→ ((i + 1, ρ, s) :: fr, G)
Pm[i] = iconst n
F −→ ((i + 1, ρ, n :: s) :: fr, G)
Pm[i] = new C o = C
fresh(Ci,G)
i
G′ = new(o, C)
F −→ ((i + 1, ρ, G′.ς−1(o) :: s) :: fr, G ∪ G′)
Pm[i] = ifeq a n 6= 0
((i, ρ, n :: s) :: fr, G) −→ ((i + 1, ρ, s) :: fr, G)
Pm[i] = ifeq a n = 0
((i, ρ, n :: s) :: fr, G) −→ ((a, ρ, s) :: fr, G)
Pm[i] = load x
F −→ ((i + 1, ρ, ρ(x) :: s) :: fr, G)
Pm[i] = store x
((i, ρ, n :: s) :: fr, G) −→ ((i + 1, ρ[x 7→ n], s) :: fr, G)
Pm[i] = getfield fC′ n 6= null n
′ ∈ adjG(G.ς
−1(n), fC′ )
((i, ρ, n :: s) :: fr, G) −→ ((i + 1, ρ, G.ς(n′) :: s) :: fr, G)
Pm[i] = putfield fC′ n 6= null v ∈ Val n
′ ∈ adjG(G.ς
−1(n), fC′ )
((i, ρ, v :: n :: s) :: fr, G) −→ ((i + 1, ρ, s) :: fr, G[n′ 7→ v])
Pm[i] = putfield fC′ n 6= null v /∈ Val
((i, ρ, v :: n :: s) :: fr, G) −→ ((i + 1, ρ, s) :: fr, G[(G.ς−1(n), fC′ ) 7→ G.ς
−1(v)])
Pm[i] = invoke mC′ o 6= null
((i, ρ, pnm :: · · · :: p1 :: o :: s) :: fr, G) −→ ((0, {0 7→ o, 1 7→ p1 . . . nm 7→ pnm}, ) :: (i, ρ, s) :: fr, G)
Pm[i] = areturn
((i, ρ, v :: s) :: (i′, ρ′, s′) :: fr, G) −→ ((i′ + 1, ρ′, v :: s′) :: fr, G)
where F = ((i, ρ, s) :: fr,G). prim op stands for primitive operations with two parameters. The
function fresh(c,G) returns a natural k such that ck is not used as a vertex label in G.
Figure 3: A subset of operational semantics rules
We use the notion of postdominance as defined in [3]: in a control flow graph CFB
of a block B, a node n′ post-dominates a node n if n′ belongs to any path from n
to Exit(B). We denote PD(n) the set of post-dominators of n. The immediate post-
dominator of n, ipd (n) ∈ PD(n) satisfies that∀n′′ ∈ PD(n), if n′′ 6= n′, then n′′ ∈
PD(n′). In a block B with control flow graph CFB , for each conditional instruction
B[i] = ifeq a, we define its dependency region as the set of instructions executed
under this condition: reg(i) = ReachCFB (i) r ReachCFB (ipd(i)). We compute a
function cxt : B → ℘(B) representing the context (the set of conditional bytecodes)
under which each instruction is executed: cxt(i) = {j | i 6= j ∧ i ∈ reg(j)}.
3.3 Assumption about programs : ”Structured” Blocks
We restrict blocks we consider by means of by a graph grammar G. This grammar
allows us to rewrite a graph into another one according to some production rules. These
rules have a single node in the left part and a graph in their right part. Nodes in the
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left-hand side of transition rules are non-terminals We assume a unique non-terminal
B for blocks wich is also the axiom of G. Nodes corresponding to bytecodes are non-
terminals and cannot be rewritten.
The grammar G is given by the following set of production rules of Figure 4 (the
entry-point in the right-side is the dashed one). Note that in these production rules, for
the bytecode ifeq the two children of this node are distinguished, as according to the
concrete semantics, they correspond to two different rules.
B b
B
B
B
B
ifeq
B
B
(sequence) (bytecode) (if then)
B
ifeq
B
B
B
ifeq
B B
B
B
ifeq
B B
(if else) (if then else) (while)
B
ifeq
B B
B
ifeq
BB
B
ifeq
BB
(repeat) (while not) (repeat not)
Figure 4: Graph grammar
Starting from the axiom B, a derivation is a succession of rewriting steps: a step
consists in replacing, according to a production rule B → G′, the left-hand side B by
the corresponding right-hand side G′ such that edges are tranfered as follows: each
incoming edge of the node B targets now the entry-point of G′. There is an edge from
the exit-point of G′ to the successor of B in the original graph (if any). In the resulting
graph, the nodes from the right-hand side loose their entry node status (resp. exit node
status) is they receive an incoming edge (resp. an outgoing edge).
A graph is produced by the grammar G if it can be obtained by rewriting from the
axiom. Note that all the produced graphs have unique (remaining) entry-point and exit-
point. A block is “structured” if its control flow graph is produced by G. From now on,
unless specified the blocks we consider are “structured” blocks.
3.4 Non-interference
Our analysis will compute an abstraction on how the value of some objects may depend
or not on the value of others. We formalize this notion of dependency through non-
interference: roughly, at the method level, the non-interference between an object ω
and an input value η (of primitive type) can be stated as “changing of value of η does
not affect the value of ω”. The “value” of an object is defined by the values of its fields
of primitive types and recursively, by the “values” of its object fields. An input value
of a block is a value of primitive type chosen in the concrete state before the execution
of the block; formally:
INRIA
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Definition 3.1 (Set of input values) Let Q = ((i, ρ, s) :: fr, G) be a state. Then, the
set of input values of Q is I(Q) = G.V V al ∪ {x ∈ χm | ρ(x) ∈ V al}.
Definition 3.2 (Value-change) The value-change of a state Q = ((i, ρ, s) :: fr, G)
and an input value η (η ∈ I(Q)) is a state Q′ = ((i, ρ′, s) :: fr, G′) such that for some
value a of primitive type, either
• η ∈ G.V V al, ρ = ρ′ and G′ = G[η 7→ a], or
• η ∈ {x ∈ χm | ρ(x) ∈ V al}, ρ′ = ρ[η 7→ a] and G′ = G.
Definition 3.3 (Non-interference) Let B be a block. Let Q1, Q2 be two states such
that Q2 = instrB(Q1). Let G1, G2 be the memory graphs of Q1 and Q2 respectively.
For some input value η from I(Q1) and for any object node ω in G1, η does not
interfer in B with ω if for Q′1, a value-change of Q1 and η, and the state Q′2 (having
G′2 for memory graph) equal to instrB(Q′1) it holds that
G2bωc ≡ G
′
2bωc.
4 Intra-method abstract dependency
In this section, we present the core of our analysis, that is the design of the dependency
graph. The dependency graph is an ”abstraction” of the memory graph and contains
all possible dependencies between objects and input values. In Section 5, we formal-
ize non-interference: an object and an input value do not interfeer if there is no path
between them in the dependency graph.
We present here the intra-method analysis and take in consideration programs with-
out method call: the algorithm consists in computing a dependency graph for each pro-
gram point of a method. The method invocation and inter-method analysis is discussed
in Section 6. Our approach can be context-insensitive or context-sensitive.
4.1 The abstract model: Dependency graph
Let us present the abstract model on an example. We consider the example in Figure
5 and the dependency graph obtained after the execution of method m. To help the
reader, we refer to Java source code, but our analysis works on Java bytecode.
The dependency graph G at a program point is a representation of the concrete
memory such that, when restricted to objects, G and the memory graph are related by
an abstraction relation. Then the abstraction G is prolonged with primitive values and
implicit flow dependencies. Nodes in this graph contain abstractions of JVM objects,
constants and newly created objects as well as initial values of primitive type of the
method. For a dependency graph G, GObj denotes the set of nodes abstracting JVM
objects, while GVal denotes the nodes corresponding to primitive values. As for the
memory graph, we can define by ΠObj(G) the restriction of a dependency graph G to
objects.
Hence, nodes of the graph G are defined to take into account the model:
• nnpc, pc ∈ Pm: node modeling all the objects created by the execution of the
object allocation instruction pc. We use the object allocation site model as all
objects created at the same program statement have the same abstraction,
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• ncpc, pc ∈ Pm: constant value created at instruction pc. There is a unique node
for every constant creation statement in the method,
• nnull−1 : special node for null.
0: void m(A p1, A p2, int h){
1: if(h)
2: v = p1;
3: else
4: v = p2;
5: v.f = 0;
6: }
p1 p2
p3 nc5p1.f p2.f
〈f
, i
〉
〈f, d〉 〈f
, i
〉
〈f
,
d〉
〈f
,
d〉
〈f
, d
〉
Figure 5: A Dependency Graph
Static variables can be modeled as fields of a global object, ns−1, thus instructions
dealing with static variables are similar to the ones treating normal objects. Arrays are
objects having two fields: length and content, holding all the elements of the array.
Edges represent links between nodes; they are labeled with 〈f, q〉, where f ∈
Fields is the name of the field ans and q ∈ F = {d,i} is the type of flow: i for
implicit flow and d for direct links, with the order relation i v d.
Let us present the abstract model on an example. We consider the example in
Figure 5 and the dependency graph obtained after the execution of method m. To help
the reader, we refer to Java source code, but our analysis works on Java bytecode. The
edge labeled 〈f,d〉 between p1 and nc5 shows that there is direct flow, arising from an
assignment, from nc5 to the field f of p1. The edge labeled 〈f,i〉 between p1 and p3
expresses the implicit flow: the value of p3 might be deduced from the field f of p1.
To deal with implicit flows, we use the notion of regions. When executing an
instruction i which adds an edge (u, v, 〈f,d〉), edges having the form (u, v ′, 〈f,i〉)
are also added, where v′ is the value tested by conditional instructions in cxt(i). The
intuition behind is that someone who knows the control structure of the program and
can observe the field f of u, is able to deduce the value of v′.
To unify the model, we add a special value field ref of primitive type to each
object, which stands for the address of the object. When comparing two objects or
an object to null, the value tested is the ref field. The code if(o == null)
a.x = b generates an implicit flow from the field x of a to the address ref of o (
(a, o.ref, 〈x,i〉)).
Implicit flows are from objects modified inside a region to values on which the
execution of the region depends. These facts combined with the use of the special field
ref , allow us to deduce the properties of a dependency graph:
1. any node u ∈ G.V Val is a leaf,
2. for any edge of type (u, u′, 〈f,i〉) ∈ G.E), u ∈ G.V Obj \ {nnull−1 } and u′ ∈
G.V Val .
These properties state that edges between two references are always direct edges:
if u1, u2 ∈ G.V Obj and (u1, u2, 〈f, t〉) ∈ G.E then t = d. Value nodes are always
leaves, and implicit edges are always between a reference and a value node. Thus, the
edges generated by the information flow and the primitive values are not imprecated
in the graph restricted to objects. Our construction is a points-to graph prolonged by
edges about primitive values and implicit flows.
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(ρ, v1 :: v2 :: s, G)
(ρ, v1 ∪ v2 ∪ TVΓ :: s, G)
prim op
(ρ, s, G)
(ρ, {〈nni , d〉} ∪ TVΓ :: s, G)
new i C
(ρ, s, G)
(ρ, s, G)
goto a
(ρ, s, G)
(ρ, {(nnull
−1 , d)} ∪ TVΓ :: s, G)
aconst null
(ρ, v :: s, G)
(ρ, s, G)
ifeq a
(ρ, s, G)
(ρ, {(nci , d)} ∪ TVΓ :: s, G)
iconst iv
(ρ, v :: s, G)
(ρ, s, G)
pop
(ρ, s, G)
(ρ, ρ(x) ∪ TVΓ :: s, G)
load x
(ρ, u :: s, G)
(ρ[x 7→ u ∪ TVΓ :: s, G)
store x
(ρ, u :: s, G)
(ρ, {(e, t) | e ∈ adjG(e
′, 〈fC′ , t〉) ∧ e
′ ∈ V ud } ∪ {〈e, i〉 | e ∈ V
u
i } ∪ TVΓ :: s, G)
getfield fC′
(ρ, v :: u :: s, (V, E))„
ρ, s,
„
V,
E ∪{(e, e′, 〈fC′ , t〉)|〈e, d〉 ∈ u, e 6= n
null
−1 , 〈e
′, t〉 ∈ v}
∪{(e, e′, 〈fC′ , i〉)|〈e, d〉 ∈ u, e 6= n
null
−1 , e
′ ∈ Γ ∪ V ui }
«« putfield fC′
with V ud = {e | 〈e, d〉 ∈ u} V
u
i = {e | 〈e, i〉 ∈ u} TVΓ = {〈e, i〉 | e ∈ Γ}
Figure 6: Subset of the abstract transformation rules
4.2 Abstract semantics
Building the dependency graph requires to approximate local variables and stack con-
tents, and to deal with implicit flow, we must know the conditions under which the
local variables and the stack are modified. Thus, elements from stack and local vari-
ables have the form 〈u, t〉 where u ∈ G.V and t ∈ F . Hence, an abstract state is of
the form Q = (ρ, s, G) where G is the dependency graph, ρ is a mapping from χm to
℘(G.V ×F) and s is the stack with elements in ℘(G.V ×F).
For every type of bytecodes b, we define a transformation rule Q′ = instrb(Q, Γ)
where Γ is the set of nodes u corresponding to values on which depends the execution
of the bytecode, reflecting the impact of the implicit flow. The semantics of transfor-
mation rules is presented in Figure 6.
To reflect the impact of control regions on stack and local variables array, every
instruction modifying the last two (push for stack or store for local variables array)
takes into consideration the values in the context. For example, the instructions new
and iconst push on the stack new abstract values but also the context under which
the operation takes place. The store bytecode, stores in the local variable array not
only the top of the stack, but also the nodes in Γ, as the writing is done under its control.
The instruction getfield pushes on the stack the adjacent of u , if u is an object
reference, or keeps u on the stack if it is primitive value arising from implicit flow.
The most significant bytecode is putfield, as it modifies the dependency graph.
Apart edges from direct nodes in u (having the form (e,d)) to elements in v, implicit
flow edges from the nodes e ((e,d) ∈ u) to nodes in Γ, the instruction adds implicit
flow edges from nodes e ( (e,d) ∈ u) to implicit nodes e′ ((e′,i) ∈ u). The presence
of nodes like (e′,i) in u signifies that the objects in u depend on e′. Thus, we propagate
the implicit dependencies of an object to every field being modified of that object.
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4.3 Algorithm
From now on, we assume that a method or a block is represented by its control flow
graph.
Our analysis is flow sensitive as it computes a dependency graph at each program
point. The analysis is defined in the context of a monotone framework [16] for data
flow analysis. To comply with the framework, we define an order relation v and a
join operator t on the property space S (the set of pairs (Q, Γ)) and the execution of a
method as a set of equations using the transformation rules instrb.
Definition 4.1 (Ordering relation on S) Let S1 = ((ρ1, s1, G1), Γ1) ∈ S and S2 =
((ρ1, s1, G1), Γ2) ∈ S be two states. Then, S1 is said to be smaller than S2, i.e.
S1 v S2 if and only if s1 v s2, ρ1 v ρ2, G1 ⊆ G2 and Γ1 ⊆ Γ2.
To order the local variables ρ1 and ρ2 we use the classical point-wise ordering
relation between functions. Given two stacks s1 and s2, s1 is said to be smaller than
s2, i.e. s1 v s2, if both stacks are empty or if s1 = v1 :: s′1 and s2 = v2 :: s′2 with
v1 ⊆ v2 and s′1 v s′2.
The join operator is defined as follows: (Q1, Γ1)t (Q2, Γ2) = (Q1tQ2, Γ1∪Γ2).
The join operatort on two states (ρ, s, G) = (ρ1, s1, G1)t(ρ2, s2, G2) is a component
wise operator (s = s1 t s2, etc).
Then, (S,v,t) forms a semi-joint lattice which satisfies the Ascending Chain
Property [16] (all increasing sequences in S become eventually constant) required by
the monotone framework.
We can now define the analysis of a block of instructions B ⊆ Pm of a method m
as an equation system EB , starting from a given initial state (Q0, Γ0) (remind that we
consider terminating executions without exception and we consider here initial states
that allow such executions).
For every node i in the control flow graph of B, (Qi, Γi) represent the state and
the context (required by the implicit flow) under which the instruction i is executed:
It represents, the conditions tested (the top of the stack) by the instructions in cxt(i).
Thus, for all nodes i in CFB :
(Qi, Γi) =


(Q0 tj∈pred(i) instrB[j](Qj , Γj), if i = Entry(B)
Γ0 ∪ {u | 〈u, t〉 ∈ v with Qk = (ρ, v :: s, G), k ∈ cxt(i)})
(tj∈pred(i)instrB[j](Qj , Γj), otherwise
{u | 〈u, t〉 ∈ v with Qk = (ρ, v :: s, G), k ∈ cxt(i)})
(4.1)
The transformation rules are monotone with respect to the ordering relationv, thus we
can solve the system (4.1) using standard methods for monotone dataflow analysis.
Lemme 4.2 (Monotonicity of the transformation rules) For every instruction b, the
transformation rule instrb is monotone with respect to the ordering relation v.
The Proof of this Lemma is made by case analysis on each instruction b, based on
the transformation rules in Figure 6, it is given in Appendix A.
Our algorithm is a forward dataflow may-analysis [10], as the computed depen-
dency graph for a given program point is the union of graphs created by all the execu-
tion paths reaching that point.
For a block B and a pair (Q, Γ), we define instrB(Q, Γ) as the state
instrB[e](Qe, Γe) where e = Exit(B) and (Qe, Γe) is obtained in the least solution of
the system of equations EB starting from the initial state (Q, Γ).
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0: void m (C a, C b) {
1: int i=1;
2: int j=0;
3: int k=2;
4: a.x = i;
5: v.f = 0;
6: b.x = k-a.x-j;
6: }
a b
1 1
x x
(a) memory graph
n
p
1 n
p
2
nc1 n
c
2 n
c
3
x x
xx
(b) dependency graph
Figure 7: Relations Example
4.4 Relations between abstract and concrete worlds
We now relate formally abstract and concrete semantics. We consider abstraction func-
tions to relate restrictions of our memory graphs to nodes representing objects and de-
pendency graphs. Because of the allocation site model, it is possible to relate concrete
nodes to abstract nodes in a non ambiguous manner. For complete graphs (including
nodes representing values), we cannot define an abstract relation since it is not possible
to associate uniquely a concrete node value with an abstract one in the model we use.
Let us consider the example of Figure 7. The execution of the method m leads to
the memory graph 7(a). Anyway, as we aim at capturing the flow between data, our
analysis produces the dependency graph 7(b) for m. For example, it is not possible to
decide which node to associate with the concrete dashed node: nc1, nc2, or nc3 since the
value 1 is the result of a calculus that implies several values. This is the reason why
the abstraction relation is only defined for the restriction of graphs to their object part.
Definition 4.3 (Abstraction of a memory graph) Let V and V be two sets of nodes.
A relation α from V to V is an abstraction function if it is a mapping that respects the
allocation site model: for all k, all the Cki are mapped to nni , and for all u ∈ V such
that ς(u) = null, α(u) = nnull−1 . This relation is canonically extended to graphs
defined over sets of nodes V and V . Let G be a memory graph with G.V = G.V Obj ⊆
V . Then α(G) is the graph
({α(u) | u ∈ G.V Obj}, {(α(u), α(v), 〈e,d〉) | u, v ∈ G.V Obj ∧ (u, v, e) ∈ G.E}).
Definition 4.4 (α-abstraction) Let G be a memory graph and G be an abstract graph.
Then, G is an α-abstraction of G, denoted by G Cα G if α(ΠObj (G)) ⊆ ΠObj(G).
The abstraction function must be defined between the full state manipulated by the
program instructions. The stack abstraction is a component-wise operation. The local
variables abstraction is defined similarly.
Definition 4.5 (Stack abstraction) Let α be an abstraction function. Let G be a mem-
ory graph and G be an abstract graph such that G Cα G. An abstract execution stack
s is the α-abstraction of a concrete execution stack s (denoted by s Cα s), if s,s are
both empty or if s =v :: s1, s =v :: s1, s1 Cα s1, and (α(G.ς−1(v)),d) ∈ v if
v ∈ G.V Obj .
Definition 4.6 (State abstraction) Let α be an abstraction function. Given a con-
crete state Q = ((pc, ρ, s) :: fr, G) and an abstract state Q = (ρ, s, G), Q is an
α-abstraction of Q (denoted by Q Cα Q) if G Cα G, s Cα s, and ρ Cα ρ.
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5 Soundness of the intra-method analysis
We now prove the correctness of the construction presented in the previous section
with respect to non-interference: if there is no dependency (path in the abstract graph)
between an object and an input value, then changing the input value in the concrete
graph will not affect the concrete graph of the object. Thus, this section is devoted to
the proof of a non-interference theorem.
Definition 5.1 (α-abstraction extension) Let Q = ((i, ρ, s) :: fr , G) be a concrete
state, and Q = (ρ, s, G) such that Q Cα Q. Then, αQ : I(Q) −→ ℘(G.V V al) is the
unique extension of α in Q if
∀η ∈ I(Q) ∩G.V V al, αQ(η) = {η | ∃(α(u), η, 〈f,d〉) ∈ G.E, with(u, η, f) ∈ G.E}
∀η ∈ I(Q) ∩ χm, αQ(η) = {e | 〈e, t〉 ∈ ρ(η))}
Definition 5.2 Let α be an abstraction function. Let Q = ((i, ρ, s) :: fr , G) be a
concrete state, Q = (ρ, s, G) such that Q Cα Q. Let β ⊆ G.V V al. For any v ∈
G.V Obj , we have freeα(v, β, Q) if one of the following conditions holds:
• ∃ (u, v, f) ∈ G.E, with u ∈ G′.V Obj and β ∩ adjG(α(u), f) = ∅,
• ∃x such that (α(v),d) ∈ ρ(x) and 6 ∃(η,i) ∈ ρ(x) with η ∈ β,
• ∃i such that (α(v),d) ∈ s[i] and 6 ∃(η,i) ∈ s[i] with η ∈ β.
Theorem 5.3 (Non-interference) Let B be an instruction block. Let Q1 be a concrete
state, Q1 such that Q1 Cα Q1, Q2 = instrB(Q1), and Q2 = instrB(Q1, Γ1). Let
G1 be the memory graph of Q1 and G2 be the abstract graph from Q2. For an object
node ω in G1.V Obj and an input value η from I(Q1) such that freeα(ω, αQ1(η), Q1),
if ReachG2(α(ω)) ∩ αQ1(η) = ∅ then η does not interfer with ω in B.
The first step of the proof consists in the soundness of the pointer analysis contained in
our analysis. After defining the notion of state-variation which describes how states can
be affected by the modification of input values, we complete the proof of soundness for
our analysis by the non-interference theorem. As we compare, in this section, concrete
and abstract worlds, we denote by e a concrete element and by e an abstract element.
Note that e is just an abstract element, and not necessarily the abstraction of e.
5.1 Abstraction correctness
We show that when the dependency graphs are restricted to references, our analysis is a
sound points-to analysis. We rely on the dataflow framework which is slightly adapted
to take into account the flow information of the Γ’s.
Lemme 5.4 (Local Soundness) Let α be an abstraction function. Let Q be an execu-
tion state and Q an abstract state such that Q Cα Q. Then for any bytecode b, for any
set of abstract values Γ, instr b(Q) Cα instrb(Q, Γ).
The proof is done by case analysis on each bytecode instruction and can be found
in Appendix B.1.
We now want to establish the following property.
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Proposition 5.5 (Points-to correctness) Let B be a block, Q be a good initial (con-
crete) state for B, α be an abstraction function, and Q be an abstract state. Then, for
any set of abstract values Γ,
Q Cα Q implies instrB(Q) Cα instrB(Q, Γ).
The proof relies on the general theorem stating the correctness of the global sound-
ness provided that the local correctness holds. However, our system of equations is
defined for a pair (Q, Γ) and the computation of the values of Γ’s is not performed
structurally on the control flow graph but based on regions instead.
Our proof will simply show that the restriction to objects of dependency graphs
from the computed abstract states Q are independent from the Γ’s. Therefore, we will
be able to define a new system of equation E ′B for a block B that differ from EB only on
the interpretation of the functionals appearing in the system, that becomes independent
of Γ. But it turns out that the points-to graphs in the states computed for EB and E ′B
are identical.
For two dependency graphs G, G′, we write G .= G′ iff G, G′ are equal when
restricted to their object part, ie ΠObj(G) = ΠObj(G′). This relation .= is also defined
on sets of typed-flow vertices as : S1
.
= S2 if {e | 〈e,d〉 ∈ S1 ∧ e ∈ VObj} = {e |
〈e,d〉 ∈ S2 ∧ e ∈ VObj}, where VObj is a set of vertices. This relation is extended to
abstract as follows: Q = (ρ, s, G) .= (ρ′, s′, G′) = Q′ if G .= G′ and
• for all x in χm, ρ(x)
.
= ρ′(x)
• either s = s′ = ε or s = u :: st, s′ = u′ :: s′t, u
.
= u′ and st
.
= s′t.
Proposition 5.6 For any concrete state Q, for any abstract states Q, Q′, if Q Cα Q
and Q .= Q′ then Q Cα Q′.
Proof. Let Q = ((i, ρ, s) :: fr, G), Q = (ρ, s, G) and Q′ = (ρ′, s′, G′). From the
definition 4.6 of state abstraction, Q Cα Q′, if s Cα s′, ρ Cα ρ′ and G Cα G′. By
hopthesis, Q Cα Q thus s Cα s, ρ Cα ρ and G Cα G. Moreover Q .= Q′ thus
s
.
= s′, ρ
.
= ρ′ and G .= G′.
Let us first prove that G Cα G′. From G .= G′ we have ΠObj(G) = ΠObj(G
′
). Since
G Cα G, α(ΠObjG) ⊆ ΠObjG = ΠObjG
′
. Thus G Cα G′.
Let us now prove that s Cα s′. Let s = u :: st, s = u :: st and s′ = u′ :: s′t. As
s Cα s, thus st Cα st and (α(G.ς−1(u)),d) ∈ u if u ∈ G.V Obj . If u ∈ G.V Obj , then
α(G.ς−1(u)) ∈ G.V Obj .
By hpothesis, s .= s′. From the definition of s .= s′ if s = s′ =  or, u .= u′ and
st
.
= s′t. Moreover, the two sets of typed-flow nodes, u and u′, are equal accoding to
.
=
relation if {e | 〈e,d〉 ∈ u ∧ e ∈ G.V Obj} = {e | 〈e,d〉 ∈ u′ ∧ e ∈ G′.V Obj}. Thus,
if α(G.ς−1(u)) ∈ G.V Obj and (α(G.ς−1(u)),d) ∈ u then (α(G.ς−1(u)),d) ∈ u′.
Hence s Cα s′.
The proof for local variables array is similar.
Proposition 5.7 For all states Q1, Q′1, Q2, Q′2,
• if Q1 .= Q2 and Q′1 .= Q′2 then Q1 tQ′1 .= Q2 tQ′2,
• for any bytecode b, for any Γ1, Γ2, if Q1 .= Q2 then
instrb(Q1, Γ1)
.
= instrb(Q2, Γ2)
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Proof. For the first point, as t is defined component-wise for stacks and mappings ρ,
the only part to be proved is for graphs.
If Q1.G
.
= Q2.G then the two graphs are equal when restricted to their object part,
thus ΠObj(Q1.G) = ΠObj(Q2.G). Moreover, ΠObj(Q′1.G) = ΠObj(Q′2.G), hence
ΠObj(Q1.G) ∪ ΠObj(Q′1.G) = ΠObj(Q2.G) ∪ ΠObj(Q
′
2.G).
We must prove that ΠObj(Q1.G∪Q′1.G) = ΠObj(Q2.G∪Q′2.G). It is enough to prove
that, for two dependency graphs G and G, ΠObj(G ∪G′) = ΠObj(G) ∪ ΠObj(G′).
The proof lies on the property of dependency graphs stating that any node u ∈ G.V V al
is a leaf. Thus, a dependency graph contains only edges between two objects or edges
from an object to a value: there is no edge from a value to an object node. When
making the union of two dependency graphs, the only edges between objects can come
from the two dependency graphs. Thus, give restriction to objects part of the union
of two graphs is equal to the union of the restrictions of the two graphs to objects:
ΠObj(G ∪G′) = ΠObj(G) ∪ ΠObj(G′).
For the second point, we make a case analysis on each bytecode instruction: details can
be found in Appendix B.2.
Let us consider the system of equations EB . Each right-hand side can be seen as a
functional over (Qi, Γi), the unknowns. Let us define the system E ′B with (Q0, ∅) for
initial state:
(Qi, Γi) =


(Q0 tj∈pred(i) instrB[j](Qj , Γj), if i = Entry(B)
{u | 〈u, t〉 ∈ v with Qk = (ρ, v :: s, G), k ∈ cxt(i)})
(tj∈pred(i)instrB[j](Qj , Γj), otherwise
{u | 〈u, t〉 ∈ v with Qk = (ρ, v :: s, G), k ∈ cxt(i)})
We define for a block B and the system E ′B , the mapping instr
′
B(Q, Γ) as we did
for instrB(Q, Γ) and EB.
Obviously, for the least solution of E ′B , we have that Γi = ∅ for all i. Therefore, the
functionals in the right-hand side and thus, the solution of the system are independent
from the Γ′. As Lemma 5.4 establishes the local soundness for all Γ’s, in particular for
∅, we have that the global soundness holds for the system E ′B , that is
Q Cα Q implies instrB(Q) Cα instr
′
B(Q, ∅) (5.1)
However, the system EB involves the Γ’s which influence on the values of the Q’s
but not on their object part as we show now.
Proposition 5.8 Provided that their respective initial states satisfies Q .= Q′, then for
the respective least solution of EB and E ′B , we have that Qi .= Q′i for all i.
Proof. We rely here on the iterative construction of the least solution of equation
systems. Starting from the valuation assigning the least value of the lattice to all the
unknowns, that is the Qi, Γi’s and the Q′i, Γ′i’s respectively, we compute a new value
for these valuations (at the left-hand side of equalities) by using the old values in the
right-hand side. Eventually, a fixed point is reached during that computation.
Then, the proof goes by induction on n, the minimal number of iteration required to
reach a fixed point in both system using Proposition 5.7 for the induction step.
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Proposition 5.9 For any block B, for any Γ1, Γ2, if Q1 .= Q2 then instrB(Q1, Γ1) .=
instr
′
B(Q2, Γ2)
Proof. Straightforward from Propositions 5.8 and 5.7.
By combining the global soundness (5.1), Propositions 5.9 and 5.6, we get Propo-
sition 5.5 as result. This ensures correctness for dependency graph restricted to ref-
erences. The points-to analysis is a flow-sensitive may-analysis, similar to previous
work [18, 20]. In the next subsection, we prove the correctness of the primitive edges
(implicit and direct flow) as a non-interference theorem relying on the correctness for
the points-to analysis.
5.2 Analysis correctness
To prove the non-interference theorem, according to Definition 3.3, we need to make
values vary at some program point according to Definition 3.2 and to check the im-
pact of this variation on objects at another program point. Thus, we first define the
notion of state variation that captures how a concrete execution state, corresponding
to a program point i, might change when a value η has changed in the past of this ex-
ecution. Definition 5.13 contains an over estimation of the set of states that the JVM
can reach after this change: the main impact is on the memory graph, but the local
variables and stack can also be affected. The correctness of the definition is proved
later in Proposition 5.15.
Definition 5.10 (Graph variation) Let α be an abstraction function. Let Q = ((i, ρ, s) ::
fr , G) be a concrete state, Q=(ρ, s, G) such that Q Cα Q. Let β ⊆ G.V V al be a set
of nodes of primitive type. Then G′ is a graph variation of G with respect to G and β,
denoted G′ = υ(G, G, β), if it is obtained from G applying one of the following rules:
1. G′ = G[v 7→ x] with x ∈ V al, if ∃(u, v, f) ∈ G.E, ∃η ∈ β and t ∈ F such that
(α(u), η, 〈f, t〉) ∈ G.E
2. G′ Cα G st for all v ∈ G.V Obj if freeα(v, β, Q) then v ∈ G′.V Obj and
for all (u, v, f) in G.E, with u ∈ G′.V Obj , if β ∩ adjG(α(u), f) = ∅, then
(u, v, f) ∈ G′.E.
Definition 5.11 (Stack variation) Let α be an abstraction function. Let Q = ((i, ρ, s) ::
fr, G) be a concrete state, Q = (ρ, s, G) such that Q Cα Q. Let β ⊆ G.V V al be a
set of nodes of primitive type. Then s′ is a stack variation of s with respect to s and β,
denoted by s′ = υ(s, s, β), if it is obtained from s applying one of the following rules:
1. s′ = s[i 7→ x] with x ∈ Val , if s[i] ∈ Val and ∃η ∈ β, t ∈ F such that
(η, t) ∈ s[i]
2. s′ = s[i 7→ ς(o)], if ∃η ∈ β such that (η,i) ∈ s[i] ∧ (o,d) ∈ s[i] ∧ o ∈
G′.V Obj ∧ o ∈ α−1(o)
Definition 5.12 (Local variables array variation) Let α be an abstraction function.
Let Q = ((i, ρ, s) :: fr, G) be a concrete state, Q = (ρ, s, G) such that Q Cα Q. Let
β ⊆ G.V V al be a set of nodes of primitive type. Then ρ′ is a local variables array
variation of ρ with respect to ρ and β, denoted by ρ′ = υ(ρ, ρ, β), if it is obtained from
ρ applying one of the following rules:
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1. ρ′ = ρ[i 7→ x] with x ∈ Val , if ρ(i) ∈ Val and ∃η ∈ β, t ∈ F such that
(η, t) ∈ ρ(i)
2. ρ′ = ρ[i 7→ ς(o))], if ∃η ∈ β such that (η,i) ∈ ρ(i) ∧ (o,d) ∈ ρ(i) ∧ o ∈
G′.V Obj ∧ o ∈ α−1(o)
Based on the definition of stack variation and local variables array variation, we
redefine the state variation:
Definition 5.13 (State variation) Let α be an abstraction function. Let Q = (ρ, s, G)
be a concrete state, Q = (ρ, s, G) an abstract state such that Q Cα Q. Let β ⊆
G.V V al be a set of nodes of primitive type. Then Q′ is a state variation of Q with
respect to Q and β, denoted by Q′ = ((i, ρ′, s′) :: fr, G′) = υ(Q, Q, β), if G′ =
υ(G, G, β), s′ = υ(s, s, β) and ρ′ = υ(ρ, ρ, β).
A state variation captures the impacts of the modification of a value in the past of
the execution on the current state. The main impact we are interested in concerns the
changes of the memory graph according to Definition 5.10. Anyway, the modification
of a value in the past of a state also impacts the stack and the local variables, according
to definitions 5.11 and 5.12. Rule 1 of Definition 5.11 and rule 1 of Definition 5.12
capture possible variations due to immediate use of a value corresponding to β while
rule 2 of Definition 5.11 and rule 2 of Definition 5.12 capture the impact of the changes
of a value corresponding to β to the objects that depend on it by an implicit flow.
From the definition of state variation, we can state that the variation of a state
regarding to a set β, does not impact the objects ω which have no dependence to any
node of β.
Lemme 5.14 Let α be an abstraction function, Q = ((i, ρ, s) :: fr, G), and Q =
(ρ, s, G) with Q Cα Q. Let β ⊆ G.V V al, and ω ∈ G.V Obj such that there exists no
path from α(ω) to any node of β in G. Then, in any state variation Q′ = υ(Q, Q, β) =
((i, ρ′, s′) :: fr, G′), if ω ∈ G′.V Obj , we have Gbωc ≡ G′bωc.
Proof. The differences between G and G′ are given by rules of Definition 5.10. If
ω ∈ G′.V Obj , then, for any object node v of the subgraph rooted by ω, there exists an
edge (u, v, f) ∈ G.E such that u belongs to the subgraph rooted by ω with:
• β ∩ adjG(α(u), f) = ∅ because ReachG(α(ω)) ∩ β = ∅,
• u ∈ G′.V Obj because either u = ω, or u belongs to G′.V Obj for the same
reason.
Thus, v ∈ G′.V Obj and (u, v, f) ∈ G′.E
For the leaves of the subgraph rooted by ω, rule 1 randomizes the value of v if there is
an edge (u, v, f) ∈ G.E and a flow from α(u) to a element of β labelled by f in G.
As by hypothesis, there is no path from α(ω) to any element of β in in G, it is obvious
that this modification does not affect the subgraph rooted by ω.
Proposition 5.15 states the state variation correctness, by claiming that changing an
input value and executing a block with a state variation leads us to a state variation.
Proposition 5.15 (State variation correctness) Let B be an instruction block, Q1 a
concrete state, Q1 with Q1 Cα Q1, Q2 = instrB(Q1), and Q2 = instrB(Q1, Γ1).
If Q′1 = υ(Q1, Q1, β) and Q′2 = instrB(Q′1) then Q′2 = υ(Q2, Q2, β).
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Proof. Proof. We split the proof in two parts: first we prove the theorem holds for
blocks containing a single instruction, this is done by case analysis in Appendix B.3.
Let us prove now the state variation correctness for “structured” blocks. The grammar
G defines precisely what are “structured” blocks and will be used in this proof. The
proof goes by induction on k the number of steps required to produce the control flow
graph of the block B by the grammar G. Let G be a CFG (that does not contain the
non-terminal B anymore) for some block B such that B →k G for some natural k. Let
us show that G (and thus, B) satisfies the state variation property.
For k = 1: Only production rules (bytecode) are concerned. In this case, we rely on
the correctness established for each bytecode in the previous section.
For k, the property holding for all k′ < k: in this case, there exists some graph G′
such that B → G′ →k−1 G. Depending on the rule used for B → G′: we analyse the
different cases in Appendix B.4.
We can now conclude with the proof of the non-interference theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5.3. Let B be an instruction block. Let Q1 = ((i, ρ1, s1) ::
fr1, G1) be a concrete state, Q1 = (ρ1, s1, G1) such that Q1 Cα Q1, Q2 = instrB(Q1),
and Q2 = instrB(Q1, Γ1). Let ω ∈ G1.V Obj be an object node and η ∈ I(Q1) be an
input value.
Let us consider a value-change Q′1 = ((i, ρ′1, s1) :: fr1, G′1) of Q1 and η. According
to Definition 3.2, either η is a value node of G1 and then G′1 = G1[η 7→ v], or η
is a local variable and then ρ′1 = ρ1[η 7→ v] (for some v ∈ V al). Let us denote
β = αQ1(η), then, the first case corresponds to the rule 1 of Definition 5.10, the
second case to the rule 1 of Definition 5.13, thus Q′1 = υ(Q1, Q1, β). We denote
Q′2 = instrB(Q
′
1). According to Proposition 5.15, we have Q′2 = υ(Q2, Q2, β). As
freeα(ω, αQ1(η), Q1), rule 2 of Definition 5.10 says that ω ∈ G′1.V , thus ω ∈ G′2.V .
As by hypothesis, ReachG2(α(ω))∩αQ1(η) = ∅, by applying Lemma 5.14, we obtain
G2bωc ≡ G′2bωc (for G2, G′2 the memory graphs of resp. Q2, Q′2), ie η does not
interfer with ω in B.
6 Inter-method analysis
In the previous section we show non-interference for methods without invocation. That
is to say, for a method m that does not contain any invocation, we know that the non-
interference theorem holds. In this section, we add a support for a context-insensitive
or a context-sensitive analysis with the same semantics rules. The differences between
the two ones are the construction of the inter-procedural control flow graph and the
node naming strategy.
6.1 Abstract semantics of the method invocation
To deal with method invocation, we add abstract semantics rules for invoke and
areturn bytecodes. In static analysis of inter-procedural programs, one of the main
problems is that the size of the call stack in the concrete execution is not bounded: the
abstract rule for invoke cannot sketch the operational one otherwise, we would have
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an infinite abstract domain. Some works of the literature propose an abstraction of the
call stack [12]. We propose to keep the same abstract domain than in the intra-method
analysis, in which we occult the call stack and only consider the current frame of the
method: the method invocation can be added to the framework used. Thus, the new
abstract semantics rules are given by Figure 8 where ζ is a special value.
(ρ, unm :: · · · :: u0 :: s, G)
({0 7→ u0, . . . , nm 7→ unm}, , G)
invoke m
(ρ, u :: s, G)
(ζ, u, G)
areturn
Figure 8: Abstract semantics rules for method invocation
Using these rules, we do not registered the current context before the call and use
instead a bytecode transformation before the analysis. We replace each invoke byte-
code by an ”if” region as described by Figures 9(a) and 9(b).
This transformation is syntactical: we insert some code and rename the following
bytecode numbers with a function h. It does not change the semantics of the pro-
gram since we only add dead code: bytecodes b0 to bnm+2 will never be executed.
We obtain the control flow graph for which it is obvious to see that any concrete execu-
tion Q0Q1 . . . Qi−1QiQPm[0] . . . QPm[j]Qi+1 of the original program correspond to an
execution Q0Q1 . . . Qi−1QiQa0Qc0QPm[0] . . . QPm[j]Qh(i+1) with Qi+1 = Qh(i+1).
Thus, if we obtain an abstract state Qh(i+1) that is correct for Qh(i+1), it is also correct
for Qi+1. Moreover, we keep the usual Java properties: the stack is well typed and has
always the same size at each program point.
i : invoke m
i + 1 : ...
(a) Original code
i : iconst 0
a0 : ifeq c0
b0 : pop
: ...
bnm : pop
bnm+1 : aconst null
bnm+2 : goto h(i + 1)
c0 : invoke m
h(i + 1) : ...
(b) Transformed code
Qa0 = (ρ, unm :: · · · :: u0 :: s,G)
Qb0 = (ρ, unm−1 :: · · · :: u0 :: s,G)
Qc0 = ({0 7→ u0, . . . , nm 7→ unm}, ,G)
Qh = (ρ, null :: s,G)
i
a0
Qa0
b0
bnm
bnm+1
bnm+2
Qa0
Qb0
(ρ, s, G)
Qh
c0
Pm[0]
Pm[j]
Qa0
Qc0
h(i + 1)
Qh(ζ, u, G
′)
(c) Transformed Control Flow
Figure 9: Bytecode transformation
This transformation is only used for technical reasons in the analysis of the abstract
model: the path b0 . . . bnm+2 (that is never executed in any concrete execution) is used
to ”transmit” the current context we had before the invocation to the immediate succes-
sor of the invocation, thus sketching the context save and reload that occur the concrete
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execution of an invocation. The equivalent of a context reload is done by the join oper-
ator when computing Qh(i+1). We extend the operator to the case where the local vari-
ables have the special value ζ: (ζ, u, G)t (ρ, v :: s, G′) = (ρ, v :: s, G′)t (ζ, u, G) =
(ρ, u :: s, GtG′), thus Qh(i+1) = (ρ, u :: s, G′) (since GtG′ = G′), which contains
the local variables of Qa0 , the stack of Qa0 increased with the return value of m, and
the memory resulting from the execution of m.
This is exactly the state we would obtain by saving the calling context and reloading
it after the method execution. Note that the extension of the join operator does not
affect the previous uses of the operator since we only introduce the special value ζ in
the areturn rule. Moreover to have a complete definition of t, we can define the last
case: (ζ, u, G) t (ζ, u′, G′) = (ζ, u t u′, G tG′).
Thus, we perform an analysis without any abstraction of the call stack, and keep the
same finite abstract domain as previously. We now have to define the inter-procedural
control flow graph that we use.
6.2 Inter-procedural control flow graph
We use the same framework and the same equation system than for the intra-method
analysis to perform a context insensitive or several context sensitive inter-method anal-
yses. We only have to define the pred function, that is to say the inter-procedural
control flow graph (ICFGi): the parameter i of this graph defines the precision of the
analysis.
To built the ICFG, we have to extend our naming strategy to keep disjoint instruc-
tion number sets for methods and a unique node name in the dependency graph to
respect the allocation site model. Thus, each instruction i of a method m is now named
mi (with m the fully qualified name of the method and m′ ≤ m if m′ is a method that
overwrites m.), and we use copies of method call graphs including informations about
the call sites. For example the node mi1m
j
2m
k
3 of the ICFG3 denotes the kth bytecode
of method m3 that has been called in the context of line j of method m2, that has itself
been called at line i of m1. The larger the parameter of the ICFG is, the more accurate
is the analysis but the larger is the number of states of the ICFG. Then, the ICFGk of a
set of methods M is a graph with:
ICFGkM.V = {m
i0
0 m
i1
1 . . . m
ik
k | ∀0 ≤ i ≤ k, mi ∈ M, ik ∈ Pmk , ∀0 ≤ j < k,
Pmj [ij ] = invoke mj+1}
ICFGkM.E = {(m
i0
0 . . . m
ik−1
k−1 m
i
k, m
i0
0 . . . m
ik−1
k−1 m
j
k) | (i, j) ∈ CFmk .E,
Pmk [i] 6= invoke m}
∪ {(mi00 . . . m
ik−1
k−1 m
i
k, m
′j0
0 . . . m
′jk−1
k−1 m
′0) | Pmk [i] = invoke m, m
′ ≤ m}
∪ {((mi00 . . . m
ik−1
k−1 m
i
k, m
′j0
0 . . . m
′jk
k ) | Pmk [i] = areturn,
Pm′
k
[jk − 1] = invoke m, mk ≤ m}
The ICFG0 produces a context-insensitive analysis, ICFG1 a usual context-sensitive
analysis, and so on. Note that in node names of the dependency graph like ncpc and nnpc,
pc now encodes the name of the node of the ICFG in which the constant or new object
is created. Note that our construction also takes into account overwritten methods, it
can be more precise when the dynamic types of objects can statically be computed by
only branching on the first instruction of the exact method.
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6.3 Soundness
In order to show that the extended abstract model is sound with respect to the non-
interference, we prove that the abstract semantics rules for invoke and areturn
have the same properties as the rest of bytecode. We only have to define an extension
of the relation Cα for an abstraction relation α taking into account the new value ζ.
Definition 6.1 (State abstraction (extension)) Let α be an abstraction function. Given
a concrete state Q = ((pc, ρ, s) :: fr, G) and an abstract state Q = (ρ, s, G), Q is an
α-abstraction of Q (denoted by Q Cα Q) if G Cα G and:
• v Cα s with s = v :: s′ if ρ = ζ
• s Cα s, and ρ Cα ρ, otherwise.
The extension is necessary for the areturn bytecode, in order to prove the re-
lation Cα for the value returned by the invoked method. This definition is sufficient,
since the relation Cα for the rest of the calling context is being insured by the code
transformation presented in Subsection 6.1.
For the same reasons, we need to define an extension for the state variation defini-
tion: for the areturn bytecode, and thus the special value ζ, the state variation must
hold only for the returned value.
Definition 6.2 (State variation (extension)) Let α be an abstraction function. Let
Q = ((pc, ρ, s) :: fr, G) be a concrete state, Q = (ρ, s, G) its S0-may-abstraction
such that Q Cα Q. Let β ⊆ G.V V al be a set of nodes of primitive type. Then Q′ is a
state variation of Q with respect to Q and β, denoted by Q′ = ((i, ρ′, s′) :: fr, G′) =
υ(Q, Q, β), if G′ = υ(G, G, β) and:
• v′ = υ(v, s, β) with s = v :: s′′ and s′ = v′ :: s′′′ if ρ = ζ
• s′ = υ(s, s, β), and ρ′ = υ(ρ, ρ, β), otherwise.
The detailed proof is in Appendix C.
7 Secure information flow
All the previous works on non-interference require the lattice security model of infor-
mation flow to be known from the beginning. The dependency graph contains points-to
and control flow dependency information. Once computed, the dependency graph can
be labeled with security levels and non-interference checked. We can consider any
kind of ”programs”, let us for example consider a method m (with n parameters), for
which we want to check non-interference. We have to define a initial abstract state
Q
m
init = ({0 7→ n
p
0, . . . , n 7→ n
p
n}, , Ginit) for the analysis such that Ginit.V con-
tains all the nodes required by the allocation site model, constants and nullvalue,
nodes representing static variables, and nodes representing formal parameters. For
each parameter i, npi denotes the ith parameter of the method. We add to Ginit the
minimal subgraph rooted by npi , G
p
i . This graph represents the parameter and all of
its content. To avoid infinite graphs, we use a parameter h, which is called the height
of the analysis, and represents how depth we unfold the recursive data structures. The
graph Gpi is the minimal graph that contains n
p
i such that ∀u ∈ G
p
i .V
Obj
, for each field
f1 of Type(u):
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• either there exists a path u11u12 . . . u1ku21u22 . . . u2k . . . uh1uh2 . . . uhku labeled by
(〈f1,d〉〈f2,d〉〈f3,d〉 . . . 〈fk,d〉)h in Gpi such that ∀1 ≤ i ≤ h, 1 ≤ j ≤ h,
Type(uil) = Type(u
j
l ), then (u, uh1 , 〈f1,d〉) ∈ G
p
i .E.
• or u.f1 ∈ G
p
i .V and (u, u.f1, 〈f,d〉) ∈ G
p
i .E.
Then, we use that description of ”formal” initial state. Let (L,t,v) be a lattice of
security levels; for example, L = {low, high}. Then, we can define security levels on
types: let λt : Fields ×Class → L be a function that associates a security level with a
field of a class. A security function is a function that associated security levels to inputs
values and to return values (denoted by the set Ret): λi :
⋃
0≤i≤n G
p
i .V
Val ∪Ret → L
such that if v is the field f of a class C, then λi(v) = λt(f, C).
We say that a method is secure if values accessible from parameters, return value or
static variables on paths contain at least a field of higher security level than their own.
Theorem 7.1 (Secure information flow) Let m be a method, and λ i a security func-
tion. Let Q = (ρ, u :: s, G) = instrm(Qinit, ), and Ret = {v ∈ G.V | ∃(v, t) ∈ u}.
The method has secure information flow with respect toL if for every node v ∈ G.V Val
and every path o0
〈f1,t1〉
→ o1 . . . ok
〈fk,tk〉
→ ok+1 with o0 ∈ Ret∪{v ∈ G.V |= ns−1∨v =
npi }, ∃i such that λi(v) v λt(fi,Type(oi)).
The advantage of our approach is that security annotations must not be known a
priori. Changing a security level does not require a new analysis. Note that we can also
have more precise policies on instances: if o and o′ have the same type, o.f and o′.f
can be given different security levels using a function λe : Ginit.E → L instead of λt.
It is more precise but require the user to precise all the policies.
8 Conclusion
Information flow analysis aims to avoid that programs leak confidential information:
observable/public outputs of a program must not disclose information about
secret/private values manipulated by the program. Motivated by information flow anal-
ysis for Java bytecode, we propose an algorithm to compute dependency graphs, which
tracks, at different program points, how input values may influence the outputs. Such
a graph is a points-to graph extended with primitive values and flows arising from the
control structure of a program. We prove the soundness of our construction by giving a
non-interference theorem: a node a is related to a node b if the value of b may influence
the value of a.
In contrast with usual information flow techniques, our approach is flow-sensitive
and the security levels are not required to be known during the graph computation.
Changing a security level does not require reanalyzing of the code.
Our main goal is to provide an algorithm which can be use for information flow. In
the same time, as the dependency graph includes the points-to graph, our framework
can be exploited for any points-to application in program analysis, such as escape anal-
ysis and optimization.
Further works includes increasing of accuracy by considering strong update or
path-sensitivity in the analysis and studying relationships with existing information
flow analysis by considering further abstractions of our analysis algorithm. Actual
work concentrates on making our analysis compositional, which will better fit the Java
paradigm of dynamic class loading.
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A Proof of Lemma 4.2 (Monotonicity of the transfor-
mation rules)
We consider two pairs (Q1, Γ1) and (Q2, Γ2) from the property space S such that
(Q1, Γ1) v (Q2, Γ2), and let Q′1 = instrb(Q1, Γ1) and Q′2 = instrb(Q2, Γ2). We
prove that Q′1 v Q′2.
We make a proof by case analysis on each instruction b, based on the transformation
rules in Figure 6.
Case: b = prim op
Let Q1 = (ρ1, v1 :: v′1 :: s1, G1) and Q2 = (ρ2, v2 :: v′2 :: s2, G2). Since Q1 v
Q2, we also have ρ1 v ρ2, s1 v s2, G1 ⊆ G2, v1 ⊆ v2 and v′1 ⊆ v′2. Hence,
(v1 ∪ v′1) ⊆ (v2 ∪ v
′
2). From the transformation rule, Q′1 = (ρ1, v1 ∪ v′1 :: s1, G1) and
Q′2 = (ρ2, v2∪v
′
2 :: s2, G2), and as the partial order relation holds on each component,
we can conclude with Q′1 v Q′2.
Case: b = pop or b = ifeq a
Let Q1 = (ρ1, v1 :: s1, G1) and Q2 = (ρ2, v2 :: s2, G2), Q′1 = (ρ1, s1, G1) and
Q′2 = (ρ2, s2, G2). From hypothesis, (ρ1, v1 :: s1, G1) v (ρ2, v2 :: s2, G2), and thus
(ρ1, s1, G1) v (ρ2, s2, G2).
Case: b = goto a
The abstract semantics rules do not change the input, thus instrb(Q1, Γ1) = Q1 and
instrb(Q2, Γ2) = Q2. Since Q1 v Q2, we can conclude straightforward with
instrb(Q1, Γ1) v instrb(Q2, Γ2).
Case: b = iconst n or b = newiC o b = aconst null
The instruction adds an abstract element on the stack (the same element for Q1 and
Q2). Thus, the monotonicity is preserved.
Case: b = load x
From hypothesis, (ρ1, s1, G1) v (ρ2, s2, G2). Thus, ρ1(x) ⊆ ρ2(x) and (ρ1, ρ1(x) ::
s1, G1) v (ρ2, ρ2(x) :: s2, G2).
Case: b = store x
Let Q1 = (ρ1, u1 :: s1, G1), Q2 = (ρ2, u2 :: s2, G2), instrb(Q1, Γ1) = (ρ1[x 7→
u′1], s1, G1), where u′1 = u1 ∪ {(t,i) | t ∈ Γ1}], and instrb(Q2, Γ2) = (ρ2[x 7→
u′2], s2, G2), where u′2 = u2 ∪ {(t,i) | t ∈ Γ2}]. To prove the monotonicity, we
must show that u′1 ⊆ u′2. As Q1 v Q2 and Γ1 ⊆ Γ2(from hypothesis), we also
have u1 ⊆ u2 and {(t,i) | t ∈ Γ1} ⊆ {(t,i) | t ∈ Γ2}. Hence, u′1 ⊆ u′2 and
instrb(Q1, Γ1) v instrb(Q2, Γ2).
Case: b = getfield fC′
Let Q1 = (ρ1, u1 :: s1, G1), Q2 = (ρ2, u2 :: s2, G2), instrb(Q1, Γ1) = (ρ1, u′1 ::
s1, G1) and instrb(Q2, Γ2) = (ρ2, u′2 :: s2, G2). To prove the monotonicity, we
must show that u′1 ⊆ u′2, where u′1 = {(e,d) | e ∈ adjG1(e′, 〈fC′ ,d〉) ∧ (e′,d) ∈
u1} ∪ {(e,i) | (e,i) ∈ u1}. From u1 ⊆ u2, obviously, {(e,i) | (e,i) ∈ u1} ⊆
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{(e,i) | (e,i) ∈ u2}. Let us denote by u′′1 the first set in u′1. We now show that
u′′1 ⊆ u
′′
2 , where
u′′1 = {(e,d) | e ∈ adjG1(e
′
1, 〈fC′ ,d〉) ∧ (e
′
1,d) ∈ u1}
u′′2 = {(e,d) | e ∈ adjG2(e
′
2, 〈fC′ ,d〉) ∧ (e
′
2,d) ∈ u2}.
Since G1 ⊆ G2 and u1 ⊆ u2, all the adjacents labeled by fC′ of e′1 (where (e′1,d) ∈
u1) are also adjacents of e′2 (where (e′2,d) ∈ u2). Thus u′′1 ⊆ u′′2 and u′1 ⊆ u′2.
Case: b = putfield fC′
Let Q1 = (ρ1, v1 :: u1 :: s1, (V1, E1)), Q2 = (ρ2, v2 :: u2 :: s2, (V2, E2)). Moreover,
let instrb(Q1, Γ1) = (ρ1, s1, (V1, E′1)) and instrb(Q2, Γ2) = (ρ2, s2, (V2, E′2)). To
prove the monotonicity, we must show that E ′1 ⊆ E′2. From putfield abstraction
transformation rule in Figure 6, E′1 = E1 ∪ E′′1 ∪E′′′1 , where
E′′1 = {(e, e
′, 〈fC′ , t〉)|(e,d) ∈ u, (e′, t) ∈ v1},
E′′′1 = {(e, e
′, 〈fC′ ,i〉)|(e,d) ∈ u1, e′ ∈ Γ ∪ V u1i },
V u1i = {e | 〈e,i〉 ∈ u1}.
The definition of E′2 is similar. By hypothesis, u1 ⊆ u2 and v1 ⊆ v2 , thus E′′1 ⊆ E′′2 .
Moreover, as Γ1 ⊆ Γ2, the inclusion E′′′1 ⊆ E′′′2 also holds. Thus, E ′1 ⊆ E′2.
B Soundness of the intra-method analysis
B.1 Proof of Lemma 5.4 (Local soundness)
Lemme B.1 (Local Soundness) Let α be an abstraction function. Let Q be an execu-
tion state and Q an abstract state such that Q Cα Q. Then for any bytecode b, for any
set of abstract values Γ, instr b(Q) Cα instrb(Q, Γ).
Proof.
By case analysis on each bytecode instruction. Except for the new bytecode, the other
intructions do not add new nodes to memory graph and do not change the location of
abjects. Thus, for a state Q and Q′ = instrbQ, Q.G.V Obj = Q′.G.V Obj and hence
Q.G.ς(u) = Q′.G.ς(u), for all u ∈ Q.G.V Obj . For simplicity, we denote by ς(u) the
value of Q.G.ς(u) and Q′.G.ς(u).
Case: b = prim op
From the operational semantics of prim op (Figure 3), Q = ((i, ρ, v1 :: v2 :: s) ::
fr, G) and instrb(Q) = ((i + 1, ρ, op(v1, v2) :: s) :: fr, G). From the abstract rule
of prim, Q = (ρ, v1 :: v2 :: s, G) and instrb(Q, Γ) = (ρ, v1 ∪ v2 :: s, G). From
hypothesis, we have G Cα G, ρ Cα ρ, s Cα s and since v1, v2 are not objects
we also have (op(v1, v2) :: s) Cα (v1 ∪ v2 :: s), and hence we can conclude with
instrb(Q) C
α instrb(Q, Γ).
Case: b = pop or b = ifeq a
From operational semantics, Q = ((i, ρ, n :: s) :: fr, G) and instrb(Q) = ((j, ρ, s) ::
fr, G), where j is i + 1 or a. From the abstract rules, Q = (ρ, v :: s, G) and
instrb(Q, Γ) = (ρ, s, G). As we have Q Cα Q from hypothesis, it is obvious that
instrb(Q) C
α instrb(Q, Γ).
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Case: b = goto a
Let Q = ((i, ρ, s) :: fr, G) and instrb(Q) = ((a, ρ, s) :: fr, G). The abstract seman-
tics of goto instruction does not change the input state Q, and thus instr b(Q, Γ) = Q.
The concrete semantics rule makes a jump to adress a and leaves unchanged the rest
of the frame Q. Hence the α-abstraction relation is preserved, and instrb(Q) Cα
instrb(Q, Γ).
Case: b = iconst n
The bytecode adds a primitive value on top of the stack, thus since primitive values are
not concerned by α-abstraction, we have instrb(Q) Cα instrb(Q, Γ).
Case: b = aconst null
The bytecode adds pushes null on the concrete stack and nnull−1 on the abstract stack.
By definition, α(ς−1(null)) = nnull−1 .
Case: b = new C
The instruction pushes a new object on the stack. By construction, due to the allocation
site model, the value pushed by the abstract rule (nni ) is the abstraction of the concrete
object (C fresh(Ci,G)i ) pushed on the concrete stack. The concrete graph G is enlarged
with the new object, while the dependency graph already containts the abstract node
(we remind that we suppose that all abstract values are computed from the begining).
Case: b = load x
Let Q = ((i, ρ, s) :: fr, G) and Q = (ρ, s, G). From the operational semantics rule of
load x (Figure 3), we have instrb(Q) = ((i + 1, ρ, ρ(x) :: s) :: fr, G). From the
abstract transformation rule of load x (Figure 6), we have instrb(Q, Γ) = (ρ, ρ(x) ::
s, G). By hypothesis, we have Q Cα Q, thus by definition, we have s Cα s, ρ Cα ρ
and G Cα G
The local variables array abstraction relation ρ Cα ρ implies that for all x such that
ρ(x) ∈ Obj, for all n ∈ α(ς−1(ρ(x))) we have (n,d) ∈ ρ(x). Since s Cα s, the
definition of stack abstraction gives us (ρ(x) :: s) Cα (ρ(x) :: s). We can conclude
with instrb(Q) Cα instrb(Q).
Case: b = store x
From the concrete semantics rule, if Q = ((i, ρ, n :: s) :: fr, G), then instrb(Q) =
((i + 1, ρ⊕ {x 7→ n}, s) :: fr, G). From the abstract rules, if Q = (ρ, u :: s, G), then
instrb(Q, Γ) = (ρ[x 7→ u ∪ {(t,i) | t ∈ Γ}], s, G). The α-abstraction on stack and
graphs is straightforward. From hypothesis and the α-abstraction definition on stack,
we have that α(ς−1(n)) ∈ u, thus ρ[x] ∈ ρ[x], and, as the other elements of the local
variable array do not change, ρ Cα ρ. Moreover, by hypothesis s Cα s and G Cα G,
thus the local soundness holds.
Case: b = putfield fC′
Let Q = ((i, ρ, v :: u :: s) :: fr, G) and Q = (ρ, v :: u :: s, G). We consider the case
when v /∈ V al (the case v ∈ V al is straightforward, as the edges between references
do not change and neither does the stack and local variables array).
From the operational semantics rule of putfield (Figure 3), we have instrb(Q) =
((i + 1, ρ, s) :: fr, G′). From the abstract transformation rule of putfield (Figure
6), we have instrb(Q, Γ) = (ρ, s, G′). From the hypothesis, s Cα s, ρ Cα ρ.
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We still need to prove that G′ Cα G′. Since G Cα G and because we only add and
never delete edges to/from G, all we need to prove is that the edge added by instrb
respects the abstraction property i.e. the abstraction of the edge added by instrb in G
must be in G.
As, by definition, G′ = G[(ς−1(u), fC′) 7→ ς−1(v)], the only edge added to G′ is
(ς−1(u), ς−1(v), fC′). From Q Cα Q and the stack abstraction definition, we have:
(α(ς−1(v)),d) ∈ v
(α(ς−1(u)),d) ∈ u
The abstract transformation rule of putfield adds to G′ edges having the form
(n′, n, 〈fC′ ,d〉), ∀n′ ∈ u and ∀n ∈ v.
Thus, it adds also the edge (α(ς−1(u)), α(ς−1(v)), 〈fC′ ,d〉). Thus G′ Cα G
′
.
Case: b = getfield fC′
From the semantics rules of getfield, the local variables array and the memory do
not change. Thus, we have to prove the α-abstraction for the stack. Let Q = ((i, ρ, n ::
s) :: fr, G) and Q = (ρ, u :: s, G).
By concrete and abstract semantics rules, instrb(Q) = ((i + 1, ρ, ς(n′) :: s) :: fr, G)
and instrb(Q, Γ) = (ρ, u′ :: s, G). By hypothesis, we have s Cα s, hence we still need
to show that the α-abstraction is preserved for the top of the resulted stack (between
ς(n′) and u).
We have two cases: the field fC′ is of primitive type or is an object. For the first case,
ς(n′) ∈ Val and thus the α-abstraction is preserved, as it does not apply on primitive
values. We consider the second case, in which ς(n′) ∈ Obj . From Definition 4.5 of
stack abstraction, we must prove that (α(n′),d) ∈ u, where n′ ∈ adj G(ς−1(n), fC′).
By hypothesis, we also have G Cα G, which means that α(ΠObj(G)) ⊆ G. By
definition, α(G).E = {(α(v), α(v′), 〈e,d〉) | v, v′ ∈ G.V Obj ∧ (v, v′, e) ∈ G.E}. As
α(G).E ⊆ G.E and (n, n′, fC′) ∈ G.E, we have (α(n), α(n′), 〈fC′ ,d〉) ∈ G.E, and
from the value of u′ from the abstract transformation rule of getfield, we can conclude
with (α(n′),d) ∈ u′.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 5.7
Details of the case analysis for the proof of the Proposition 5.7.
Case: b = prim op
The instruction pops two operands from the stack and pushes back the result of op on
these operands. The operands are of primitive types. Thus the relation .= holds for the
resulted stack. The local variables array and the graph are not changed.
Case: b = pop or b = ifeq a
From the abstract semantics in Figure 6, Q1 = (ρ1, v1 :: s1, G1) and instrb(Q1, Γ1) =
(ρ1, s1, G1). As the only operation performed by these bytecodes is a pop from the
stack, obviously instrb(Q1, Γ1)
.
= instrb(Q2, Γ2).
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Case: b = goto a
The transformation rules do not change the input, thus instrb(Q1, Γ1) = Q1 and
instrb(Q2, Γ2) = Q2. Since Q1
.
= Q2, we can conclude straightforward with
instrb(Q1, Γ1)
.
= instrb(Q2, Γ2).
Case: b = iconst iv or b = aconst null or b = new iC
The instruction adds an abstract element on the stack, either 〈nci ,d〉 or 〈nnull−1 ,d〉 or
〈nni ,d〉, which is always the same for Q1 and Q2. Thus, the
.
= relation is preserved.
Case: b = load x
From hypothesis, (ρ1, s1, G1)
.
= (ρ2, s2, G2). Thus, ρ1(x)
.
= ρ2(x) and thus (ρ1, ρ1(x) ::
s1, G1)
.
= (ρ2, ρ2(x) :: s2, G2).
Case: b = store x
Let Q1 = (ρ1, u1 :: s1, G1), Q2 = (ρ2, u2 :: s2, G2), instrb(Q1, Γ1) = (ρ1[x 7→
u′1], s1, G1), where u′1 = u1 ∪ {(t,i) | t ∈ Γ1}], and instrb(Q2, Γ2) = (ρ2[x 7→
u′2], s2, G2), where u′2 = u2 ∪ {(t,i) | t ∈ Γ2}]. To prove the relation
.
=, we must
show that u′1
.
= u′2, which holds because , from hypothesis, we have u1
.
= u2 and
the restriction of set {(t,i) | t ∈ Γ1} to objects in ∅. Hence, instrb(Q1, Γ1) .=
instrb(Q2, Γ2).
Case: b = getfield fC′
Let Q1 = (ρ1, u1 :: s1, G1), Q2 = (ρ2, u2 :: s2, G2), instrb(Q1, Γ1) = (ρ1, u′1 ::
s1, G1) and instrb(Q2, Γ2) = (ρ2, u′2 :: s2, G2). To prove the relation
.
=, we must
show that u′1
.
= u′2, where u′1 = {(e,d) | e ∈ adjG1(e′, 〈fC′ ,d〉) ∧ (e′,d) ∈ u1} ∪
{(e,i) | (e,i) ∈ u1}. The elements in {(e,i) | (e,i) ∈ u1} refer to value nodes,
thus they do no present interest. Let us denote by u′′1 the first set in u′1. We now show
that u′′1
.
= u′′2 , where
u′′1 = {(e,d) | e ∈ adjG1(e
′
1, 〈fC′ ,d〉) ∧ (e
′
1,d) ∈ u1}
u′′2 = {(e,d) | e ∈ adjG2(e
′
2, 〈fC′ ,d〉) ∧ (e
′
2,d) ∈ u2}.
Since G1
.
= G2 and u1
.
= u2, all the adjacents labeled by fC′ of e′1 (where (e′1,d) ∈
u1) are also adjacents of e′2 (where (e′2,d) ∈ u2). Thus u′′1 .= u′′2 and u′1 .= u′2.
Case: b = putfield fC′
Let Q1 = (ρ1, v1 :: u1 :: s1, (V1, E1)), Q2 = (ρ2, v2 :: u2 :: s2, (V2, E2)),
instrb(Q1, Γ1) = (ρ1, s1, (V1, E
′
1)) and instrb(Q2, Γ2) = (ρ2, s2, (V2, E′2)). To
prove the relation .=, we must show that (V1, E′1)
.
= (V2, E
′
2), thus the putfield
rule must add the same edges btween objects in E ′1 and in E′2.
From abstraction transformation rule in Figure 6, E′1 = E1 ∪ E′′1 ∪ E′′′1 , where E′′1 =
{(e, e′, 〈fC′ , t〉)|(e,d) ∈ u, (e′, t) ∈ v1} and E′′′1 = {(e, e′, 〈fC′ ,i〉)|(e,d) ∈ u1, e′ ∈
Γ ∪ V ui}, V
u1
i = {e | 〈e,i〉 ∈ u}. The definition of E
′
2 is similar. Edges in E ′′′1
are between objects and values, thus are not considered by .=. We must refer only
to E′′1 and E′′2 . From hypothesis, u1
.
= u2 and v1
.
= v2 , thus E′′1
.
= E′′2 . Thus,
(V1, E
′
1)
.
= (V2, E
′
2).
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B.3 Proof of Proposition 5.15 (State variation correctness for single
instruction block)
By case analysis on each instruction.
Case: b = prim op
The local variables array and the memory / dependency graphs are not affected by the
execution of this bytecode, thus we still need to prove the state variation for the stack.
Let Q1.s = n1 :: n2 :: s, Q1.s = n1 :: n2 :: s, Q′1.s = n′1 :: n′1 :: s′. From
the operational semantics rule of prim op in Figure 3, we have Q2.s = op(n1, n2),
Q′2 = op(n
′
1, n
′
2) and, from the abstract transformation rule, Q2.s = (n1∪n2) :: s. As
n1 and n2 must be primitive values (n1, n2 ∈ Val), only the rule 1 of Definition 5.11
(stack variation) can be applied to them.
If there exists η ∈ β, t ∈ F such that (η, t) ∈ n1, then the value on the top of
the stack is randomize and Q′1.s = Q1.s[0 7→ x] with x ∈ V al. Thus, Q′2.s =
Q2.s[0 7→ op(x, n2)], which corresponds to rule 1 of Definition 5.11, as (η, t) belongs
to the top of the stack in Q2.s ((η, t) ∈ n1 and obviously (η, t) ∈ (n1 ∪ n2)). Thus
Q′2.s = υ(Q
′
1.s, Q1.s, β).
Case: b = pop
In both concrete and abstract semantics, the instructions pop a value from the stack.
The rest of the stack, the local variables array and the memory/dependency graph re-
main unchanged. Thus, if Q′1 is the state variation of Q1 with respect to Q1 and β, and
Q′2 = instrb(Q
′
1) and Q2 = instrb(Q1, Γ), then Q′2 is a state variation of Q2 with
respect to Q2 and β.
Case: b = goto a
The proof is similar with the one for pop bytecode, as the instruction does not change
local the variables and memory / dependency graph and moreover, does not change the
stack.
Case: b = iconst n or b = newiC or b = aconst null
A constant value is pushed on the stack (for both states Q1 and the state variation Q′1).
The rest of the frame remains unchanged, thus the proof is straightforward.
Case: b = load x
Let Q1 = (ρ, s, G), Q2 = (ρ, ρ(x) :: s, G) (from the abstract tranformation rules in
Figure 6), Q1 = ((i, ρ, s) :: fr, G) and Q2 = ((i + 1, ρ, ρ(x) :: s) :: fr, G) (from the
semantics rule in Figure 3).
Let Q′1 = ((i, ρ′, s′) :: fr, G′) be the state variation , and Q′2 = ((i + 1, ρ′, ρ′(x) ::
s′) :: fr, G′).
The bytecode only pushes an element on the stack, thus the graph and local variables
array do not change. From hypothesis, we have G′ = υ(G, G, β), thus the dependency
graph in Q′2 is a state variation of the graph in Q2 with respect to the graph in Q2 and
β. The same reasonement applies to the local variables. We still need to prove the state
variation for stacks. q We know that s′ is a state variation of s with respect to s and
β. The top of the stack in Q′2 (ρ′(x)) respects the rules 1 and 2 of Definition 5.12 of
local variables array variation, and thus is a state variation of the top of the stack in Q2
(ρ(x)) with respect to the top of the stack in Q2 (ρ2) and β.
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Case: b = store x
The instruction stores the top of the stack in the local variable x. The proof is similar to
the load x bytecode: the top of the stack in the state variation Q′1 respects the rules
1 and 2 of stack variation definition, thus the local variable x in Q′2 respects the rules 1
and 2 of local variables array variation.
Case: b = putfield fC′
Let Q1.s = v :: u :: s, Q1.s = v :: u :: s, Q′1.s = v′1 :: u′1 :: s′1.
Since putfield does not affect the local variables and only pops elements from the
stack, we have: Q1.ρ = Q2.ρ and Q′1.ρ = Q′2.ρ.
By hypotesis, Q′1.ρ = υ(Q1.ρ, Q1.ρ, β), thus replacing Q1.ρ by Q2.ρ and Q′1.ρ by
Q′2.ρ, we obtain the variation for local variables: Q′2.ρ = υ(Q2.ρ, Q2.ρ, β). We apply
the same resonement for the stack: s = Q2.s and s′1 = Q′2.s. From the hypotesis,
Q′1.s = υ(Q1.s, Q1.s, β), thus s′1 = υ(Q2.s, s, β). By replacing s by Q2.s and s′1 by
Q′2.s, we obtain the variation for the stack: Q′2.s = υ(Q2.s, Q2.s, β).
To completely prove the state variation correctness, we still need to prove the graph
variation: Q′2.G = υ(Q2.G, Q2.G, β).
Depending on the type of the top of the stack v, there are two semantics rules for
the putfield instruction (as depicted in Figure 3). We consider each case: v is a
primitive value or an object.
Let us first consider that the field manipulated is of primitive type (v ∈ Val ).
We will make a case study based on the values of v and u, depending on β. We
distinguish the following possibilities:
• for v ∈ Val :
– either ∃η ∈ β, t ∈ F such that (η, t) ∈ v
– or ∀η ∈ β, t ∈ F(η, t) /∈ v.
• for u ∈ Obj :
– either ∃η′ ∈ β such that (η′,i) ∈ u
– or ∀η′ ∈ β, (η′,i) /∈ u.
Based on the combination of cases presented above, we distinguish the following cases
for the abstract stack, thus the following possibilities to compute the state Q′1.
Case I: ∀η ∈ β, t ∈ F , (η, t) /∈ v and ∀η′ ∈ β, (η′,i) /∈ u
In this case, the rules of the state variation do not apply on v and u, thus v ′ =
v and u′ = u. Since putfield is executed on the same objects, the same
edges are added and since Q′1.G = υ(Q1.G, Q1.G, β), the conclusion is obvious
Q′2.G = υ(Q2.G, Q2.G, β).
Case II: ∃η ∈ β, t ∈ F such that (η, t) ∈ v and ∀η′ ∈ β, (η′,i) /∈ u
We have a new value for v′ and u is not affected by the state variation (u = u′).
According to the concrete semantics, Q2.G = Q1.G[n′ 7→ v] and Q′2.G =
Q′1.G[n
′ 7→ v′], where n′ = adj G(Q1.G.ς−1(u), fC′). Applying the abstract se-
mantics of putfield, an edge (α(Q1.G.ς−1(u)), η, 〈fC′ , t〉) is added to Q2.G.
Thus, the graphs Q′2.G differs from Q2.G according to rule 1 of the definition
5.10 of Graph variation. Thus, Q′2.G is a graph variation of Q2.G with respect to
Q2.G and β.
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Case III: ∃η′ ∈ β such that (η′,i) ∈ u
According to the rule 2 of Definition 5.11 of stack variation, u 6= u′ and u′ =
ς(α−1(o), with (o,d) ∈ u. The transformation rule of putfield creates the
links (α(Q1.G.ς−1(u)), η, 〈fC′ ,i〉) and (o, η, 〈fC′ ,i〉) in Q2.G. At the con-
crete level, the semantics will change the value of adjacent of α−1(o) and not
Q1.G.ς
−1(u), which respects the rule 1 of graph variation definition.
We consider now the case when the field fC′ is of type reference (v ∈ Obj ).
The idea is the same as the previous case, when v ∈ Val : we will make a case study
based on the values of v and u, depending on β. We distinguish the following possibil-
ities:
• for v ∈ Obj :
– either ∃η ∈ β such that (η,i) ∈ v
– or ∀η ∈ β, (η,i) /∈ v.
• for u ∈ Obj :
– either ∃η′ ∈ β such that (η′,i) ∈ u
– or ∀η′ ∈ β, (η′,i) /∈ u.
Case I: ∀η ∈ β, (η,i) /∈ v and ∀η′ ∈ β, (η′,i) /∈ u
In this case, the rules of the state variation do not apply on v and u, thus v ′ = v
and u′ = u. Since putfield is executed on the same objects, the same edges are
added and since Q′1.G = υ(Q1.G, Q1.G, β), the conclusion is obvious Q′2.G =
υ(Q2.G, Q2.G, β).
Case II: ∃η ∈ β such that (η,i) ∈ v and ∀η′ ∈ β, (η′,i) /∈ u
According to the rule 2 of Definition 5.11 of stack variation, v 6= v′ and v′ =
ς(α−1(o)), with (o,d) ∈ v. The transformation rule of putfield creates the
links (α(Q1.G.ς−1(u)), η, 〈fC′ ,d〉) and (α(Q1.G.ς−1(u)), o, 〈fC′ ,d〉) in Q2.G.
At the concrete level, the semantics will add the edge (Q1.G.ς−1(u), α−1(o), fC′)
in Q′2.G and not (Q1.G.ς−1(u), v, fC′), as in Q2.G. The α-abstraction is still
preserved for Q′2.G and Q2.G, as the (α(u), o, 〈fC′ ,d〉) ∈ Q2.G.E. Thus
Q′2.G C
α Q2.G, and, according to rule 2 of Definition 5.10, we obtain the graphe
variation: Q′2.G = υ(Q2.G, Q2.G, β).
Case III: ∃η ∈ β such that (η,i) ∈ v and ∃η′ ∈ β such that (η′,i) ∈ u
According to the rule 2 of Definition 5.11 of stack variation, u 6= u′ and u′ =
ς(α−1(o)), with (o,d) ∈ u. In the same way, v 6= v′ and v′ = ς(α−1(o′)), with
(o′,d) ∈ v.
The transformation rule of putfield creates the links (α(u), η, 〈fC′ ,d〉),
(o, η, 〈fC′ ,d〉) and (α(u), o′, 〈fC′ ,d〉) and (o, o′, 〈fC′ ,d〉) in Q2.G. At the con-
crete level, the semantics will add the edge (α−1(o), α−1(o′), fC′) in Q′2.G and
not (u, v, fC′), as in Q2.G. The α-abstraction is still preserved for Q′2.G and
Q2.G, as the (o, o′, 〈fC′ ,d〉) ∈ Q2.G.E. Thus Q′2.G Cα Q2.G, and, according
to rule 2 of Definition 5.10, Q′2.G = υ(Q2.G, Q2.G, β).
Case IV: ∀η ∈ β, (η,i) /∈ v and ∃η′ ∈ β such that (η′,i) ∈ u
This case is a simplification of the previous one, thus the proof is similar.
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Case: b = getfield fC′
The intruction pops an object and pushes the field fC′ on the stack. Thus, to prove the
state variation correctness, we must refer only to the new object/value pushed on the
stack (the field fC′) and prove that it can change only accordingly to rules 1 or 2 of
Defition 5.11.
Let Q1.s = u :: s, Q1.s = u :: s, and Q′1.s = u′ :: s′ be the state variation, with
u ∈ Obj . Moreover, let Q2.s = v :: s, Q2.s = v :: s, and Q′1.s = v′ :: s′.
We can have two cases: 1) for all η ∈ β , (η,i) /∈ u or 2) there exists η ∈ β such that
(η,i) ∈ u.
1) Let us consider the first case: rule 2 does not apply to the top of the stack in Q1,
thus u′ = u. The getfield bytecode pushes on the stack the adjacent of u in Q1.G.
Since Q′1.G is a state variation of Q1.G with respect to Q1.G and β, Q1.G is an α-
abstraction of Q′1.G (Q′1.G Cα Q1.G). We have again two cases (we denote by u′′ the
node containing the object u; u′′ = Q1.G.ς−1(u)):
• either β ∩ adjQ1.G(α(u
′′), fC′) 6= ∅
• or β ∩ adjQ1.G(α(u
′′), fC′) = ∅
In the second case, the adjacent labeled fC′ of u does not change (conform to rule 2
of graph variation definition), thus the instruction pushes the same object/value on the
stack for both Q′1.G and Q1.G (v = v′).
We consider now the first case (α(u′′) has an adjacent in β in Q1.G ). Than there exists
η ∈ β and t ∈ F and an edge (α(u′′), η, 〈fC′ , t〉) in Q1.G, We have two possibilities:
fC′ is of primitive type or is of type reference.
If the field fC′ is of primitive type, the value of adjQ1.G(u′′, fC′) might change ac-
cording with the rule 1 of graph variation definition (Definition 5.10). Thus, the value
pushed on the stack in Q′1.G will differ from the one in Q1.G, but it will respect the
rule 1 of Definition 5.13, since the abstract value (η, t) will be pushed on the abstract
stack in Q2 ((η, t) ∈ v′ since (α(u′′), η, 〈fC′ , t〉) ∈ Q1.G.E ⊆ Q2.G.E).
If the field fC′ is of type reference, the adjacent of u′′ might change according to the
rule 2 of graph variation definition. Since Q′1.G Cα Q1.G and from the points-to
correctness (Proposition 5.5), we have instrb(Q′1) Cα instrb(Q1, Γ) or Q′2 Cα Q2.
Thus Q′2.s Cα Q2.s, (η,i) ∈ v′ and α(ς−1(v′)) ∈ v′. Hence the stack respects the
rule 2 of stack variation definition.
2) Let us consider now the case when there exists η ∈ β such that (η,i) ∈ u. Thus
the rule 2 of Defition 5.11 applies to u, and u′ = α−1(o), with (o,i) ∈ u. From the
abstract semantics of getfield, (η,i) is kept on the stack ((η,i) ∈ v). Thus, the
value of v′ will change, but it will respect the rules 1 or 2 of stack variation definition
(the proof is similar with the previous case, depending on the type of fC′ , primitive or
reference).
B.4 Proof of Proposition 5.15 (State variation correctness for blocks)
• (sequence) : let us name respectively B1, B2 the non-terminals in the right-hand
side from top to bottom. Let G1, G2 two graphs without non-terminals such that
in the derivation producing G, B1 →k1 G1 and B2 →k2 G2. Let B1, B2 be the
two blocks corresponding to G1, G2. Let e, e1, e2 be the exit points of B, B1, B2
respectively.
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Remind that instrB and Γe is computed from EB and instrB1 , Γe1 and instrB2 ,
Γe2 are computed from EB1 , EB2 respectively. From these definitions and the
fact that due to the definition of contexts, Γe1 is computed independently of EB2 ,
one can see that instrB(Q, Γ) is instrB2(instrB1(Q1, Γ1), Γe1) where Γe1 is
computed for EB1 with (Q1, Γ1) as initial state.
– As k1 is strictly smaller than k, by induction hypothesis, we have for G1
(and thus, B1) that for any concrete state Q1, any abstract state Q1 such
that Q1 Cα Q1, Q2 = instrB1(Q1), and Q2 = instrB1(Q1, Γ1).
If Q′1 = υ(Q1, Q1, β) and Q′2 = instrB2(Q′1) then Q′2 = υ(Q2, Q2, β).
– As k2 is strictly smaller than k, by induction hypothesis, we have for G2
(and thus, B2) that for any concrete state Q2, any abstract state Q2 such
that Q2 Cα Q2, Q3 = instrB2(Q2), and Q3 = instrB2(Q1, Γ1).
If Q′1 = υ(Q1, Q1, β) and Q′2 = instrB2(Q′1) then Q′2 = υ(Q2, Q2, β).
Hence, by combining these two results, one has that for any concrete state Q1,
any abstract state Q1 such that Q1 Cα Q1, any Γ1, denoting Q3 the abstract state
instrB2(instrB1(Q1, Γ1), Γe1),
if Q′1 = υ(Q1, Q1, β) and instrB2(instrB1(Q′1, Γ1), Γe1), then
Q′3 = υ(Q3, Q3, β). This allows us to conclude this case due to the definition of
instrB .
• (if then else) : let us name respectively B1, B2, B3 the non-terminals in the
right-hand side, B1 being the “then” block, B2 the “else” and B3 the junction
block. Let G1, G2, G3 the graphs without non-terminals such that in the deriva-
tion producing G, B1 →k1 G1, B2 →k2 G2 and B3 →k3 G3. Let B1, B2, B3 be
the blocks corresponding to G1, G2, G3 respectively. Let e, e1, e2, e3 be the exit
points of B, B1, B2, B3 respectively.
For any concrete state Q1, any abstract state Q1 such that Q1 Cα Q1, we con-
sider Q′1 = υ(Q1, Q1, β). We assume that the execution of B on Q1 leads to
execute the block B1, that is the top of the stack s1 in Q1 is equal to 0 (the
other case is dual can be be treated similarly). Let Q2 = instrifeq a(Q1),
Q3 = instrB1(Q2) and Q4 = instrB3(Q3). Now depending on the top of the
stack s1 in the abstract state Q1:
– there is no η from β such that 〈η,i〉 ∈ s1[0]: by definition of state vari-
ation, the top of the stack s′1 in Q′1 is equal to 0. Let us consider Q′2 =
instrifeq a(Q
′
1); as s
′
1[0] = 0, it is easy to see due to the semantics of the
bytecode ifeq a, Q′2 = υ(Q2, Q2, β) where Q2 = instrifeq a(Q1, Γ1).
Now, by induction hypothesis for the block B1, we have Q′3 = υ(Q3, Q3, β)
where Q′3 = instrB1(Q′2) and Q3 = instrB1(Q2, Γ′1). Let us denote
Q4 = instrB2(Q2). By weakening the state variation, one has Q′3 =
υ(Q3, Q3 t Q4, β). By induction hypothesis for the block B3, denoting
Q′4 = instrB3(Q
′
3), we have
Q′4 = υ(Q4, instrB3(Q3 tQ4, Γe1), β)
We conclude simply by using the definition of instrB .
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– there exists some η from β such that 〈η,i〉 ∈ s1[0]: assume Q1 = ((i, ρ, v ::
s) :: fr, G), the state variation Q′1 is of the form ((i, ρ′, v′ :: s′) :: fr, G′).
Let us consider Q2 = instrifeq a(Q1) = ((k, ρ, s) :: fr, G) and Q′2 =
instrifeq a(Q
′
1) = ((k
′, ρ′, s′) :: fr, G′). If k = k′ then this case is
similar to the previous case. So, we assume that k 6= k′;
Let Q3 = instrB1(Q2) and Q′3 = instrB2(Q′2); we are going to show first
that Q3 = υ(Q′3, instrB1(Q2, Γe1) t instrB2(Q2, Γe1), β).
Let u be the top of the stack in Q1. Then, for all i in both B1 and B2,
we have that all e such that 〈e,i〉 ∈ u belong to Γi. Intuitively, due to
the abstract semantics, this implies that all the modified position (memory,
local variables, stack) in concrete states can be identified in abstract states,
and are concern by state variation. Thus, they can vary to show that Q′3 =
υ(Q3, Q3tQ′3, β). Now, we can use the induction hypothesis for the block
B3 to conclude using the definition of instrB and of instrB .
• (if then) - (if else) : these cases are treated similarly to the (if then else) case.
• (while) : let us name respectively B1, B2, the non-terminals in the right-hand
side, B1 being the block within the loop and B2 the end block of the loop. Let
G1, G2 the graphs without non-terminals such that in the derivation producing G,
B1 →k1 G1 and B2 →k2 G2 Let B1, B2 be the blocks corresponding to G1, G2
respectively. Let B be the block composed by the ifeq node and B1.
For a concrete state Q1 = ((i1, ρ1, s1) :: fr, G1), let us denote Q2 = instrB(Q1)
= ((i2, ρ2, s2) :: fr, G2) for some Γ1, and let us consider an abstract state Q1
such that Q1 Cα Q1, we consider Q′1 = υ(Q1, Q1, β) and Q′2 = instrB(Q′1)
with Q′1 = ((i1, ρ′1, s′1) :: fr, G′1) and Q′2 = ((i2, ρ′2, s′2) :: fr, G′2). Let us
denote Q2 such that Q2 = instrB(Q1, Γ1) for some Γ1 and Q2 Cα Q2.
If the state variation does not impact the top of the stack in Q1 then the control
flow in the concrete execution is not modified and we are in the same situation
than for the (if then else).
If the top of the stack is impacted by the variation. Due to the abstract seman-
tics that adds elements from Γ1 to any manipulation of the state in B1, any node
or edge of G2 that differs from G1 is such that is mapping in G2 is linked by
implicit flow to elements of Γ1. The same goes for G′1 and G′2. Thus, every-
thing in the ntersection of G2 and G′2 comes from G1 and the rest is linked to
elements of β either because it has been modified in the loop or because it has
been modifed by the initial variation. In both cases it can vary under β and then
G′2 = υ(G
′
2, G2, β). We can treat similarly local variables and the stack: the
specification of Java bytecode tells us that s2 and s′2 have the same size, even if
the block B may have been executed different numbers of times to lead to Q2
and Q′2.
• (repeat) - (while not) - (repeat not) : these cases are treated similarly to the
(while) case.
C Soundness of inter-procedural analysis
We have to add the cases of the two new bytecodes (invoke and areturn), to the
proofs that have been done by case analysis on each bytecode.
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C.1 Addition to proof of Lemma 4.2
We must show that the abstract semantics rules are monotone. We consider two pairs
(Q1, Γ1) and (Q2, Γ2) from the property space S such that (Q1, Γ1) v (Q2, Γ2), and
let Q′1 = instrb(Q1, Γ1) and Q′2 = instrb(Q2, Γ2). We prove that Q′1 v Q′2.
By case analysis on each instruction b, based on the transformation rules in Figure
8.
Case: b = invoke m
Let Q1 = (ρ, unm :: · · · :: u0 :: s, G) and Q2 = (ρ′, u′nm :: · · · :: u
′
0 :: s
′, G′). From
the semantics of invoke,
instrb(Q1, Γ1) = ({0 7→ u0, . . . , nm 7→ unm}, , G)
instrb(Q2, Γ2) = ({0 7→ u
′
0, . . . , nm 7→ un′m}, , G
′).
As Q1 v Q2 and Γ1 ⊆ Γ2, we have u0 ⊆ u′0 . . . unm ⊆ u′nm , s v s
′ and G ⊆ G′,
thus instrb(Q1, Γ1) v instrb(Q2, Γ2).
Case: b = areturn
Let Q1 = (ρ, u :: s, G) and Q2 = (ρ′, u′ :: s′, G′). From the semantics of areturn,
instrb(Q1, Γ1) = (ζ, u, G)
instrb(Q2, Γ2) = (ζ, u
′, G′).
As Q1 v Q2 and Γ1 ⊆ Γ2, we have u ⊆ u′ and G ⊆ G′, thus instrb(Q1, Γ1) v
instrb(Q2, Γ2).
C.2 Addition to proof of Lemma 5.4
We show here the local soundness of the extended model, that is the abstract semantics
rules for invoke and areturn (defined in Figure 8) respect the local soundness, as
defined in Theorem 5.4, in respect with the state abstraction extension (Definition 6.1).
Case: b = invoke m
From the operational semantics of invoke m (Figure 3), we have
Q = ((i, ρ, pnm :: · · · :: p1 :: p0 :: s) :: fr, G)
instrb(Q) = ((0, {0 7→ p
′
0, 1 7→ p1 . . . nm 7→ pnm}, ) :: (i, ρ, s) :: fr, G).
From the abstract rule of invoke m (Figure 8),
(ρ, unm :: · · · :: u0 : s, G)
instrb(Q, Γ) = ({0 7→ u0, . . . , nm 7→ unm}, , G).
From hypothesis, we have G Cα G, p0 Cα u0 . . . pnm Cα unm . Moreover, the stacks
are empty and Cα. Thus, instrb(Q) Cα instrb(Q, Γ) according to definition 6.1 .
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Case: b = areturn From the operational semantics of areturn in Figure 3, we
have
Q = ((i, ρ, v :: s) :: (i′, ρ′, s′) :: fr, G)
instrbQ = ((i
′ + 1, ρ′, v :: s′) :: fr, G).
From the abstract rule of areturn:
Q = (ρ, u :: s, G)
instrb(Q = (ζ, u, G).
From hypothesis, Q Cα Q, hence G Cα G, ρ Cα myabsρ, v Cα myabsu and s Cα s.
Since instrb(Q).ρ = ζ, instrb(Q) Cα instrb(Q, Γ) according to definition 6.1 if
G Cα G and v Cα u which holds by hypothesis.
C.3 Addition to proof of Proposition 5.7
We prove the second point of the Proposition for both bytecodes, invoke m and
areturn: for any Γ1, Γ2, if Q1
.
= Q2 then instrb(Q1, Γ1)
.
= instrb(Q2, Γ2).
Case: b = invoke m
Let Q1 = (ρ, unm :: · · · :: u0 :: s, G) and Q2 = (ρ′, u′nm :: · · · :: u
′
0 :: s
′, G′). From
the semantics of invoke in Figure 8,
instrb(Q1, Γ1) = ({0 7→ u0, . . . , nm 7→ unm}, , G)
instrb(Q2, Γ2) = ({0 7→ u
′
0, . . . , nm 7→ un′m}, , G
′).
As Q1
.
= Q2, we have u0
.
= u′0 . . . unm
.
= u′nm and G
.
= G′, thus instrb(Q1, Γ1)
.
=
instrb(Q2, Γ2).
Case: b = areturn
Let Q1 = (ρ, u :: s, G) and Q2 = (ρ′, u′ :: s′, G′). From the semantics of areturn
in Figure 8,
instrb(Q1, Γ1) = (ζ, u, G)
instrb(Q2, Γ2) = (ζ, u
′, G′).
As Q1
.
= Q2, we have u
.
= u′ and G .= G′, thus instrb(Q1, Γ1)
.
= instrb(Q2, Γ2).
C.4 Addition to proof of Proposition 5.15
Case: b = invoke m
From the operational semantics of invoke m (Figure 3), we have
Q = ((i, ρ, pnm :: · · · :: p1 :: p0 :: s) :: fr, G)
instrb(Q) = ((0, {0 7→ p0, 1 7→ p1 . . . nm 7→ pnm}, ) :: (i, ρ, s) :: fr, G).
From the abstract rule of invoke m (Figure 8),
Q = (ρ, unm :: · · · :: u0 : s, G)
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instrb(Q, Γ) = ({0 7→ u0, . . . , nm 7→ unm}, , G).
Let Q′ be the state variation and
Q′ = υ(Q, Q, β) = ((i, ρ′, p′nm :: · · · :: p
′
1 :: p
′
0 :: s
′) :: fr, G′)
instrb(Q
′) = ((0, {0 7→ p′0, 1 7→ p
′
1 . . . nm 7→ p
′
nm}, ) :: (i, ρ
′, s′) :: fr, G′).
From hypothesis, we have Q′.G = υ(Q.G, Q.G, β). The stack are empty, thus the
state variation relation holds. We need to prove the state variation for the local variables
array. In Q′, p′0 varies according to rules 1 and 2 of Definition 5.11 in function of β
and u0 (the corresponding value on the abstract stack). In instrb(Q′), the value of
local variable 0 (which is p′0) is a variation of the local variable 0 in the abstract state
instrb(Q, Γ) (which is u0) and of β, thus it respects the rules 1 and 2 of Definition
5.12 which define the definition of local variables. We apply the same reasoment on
the rest of the local variables, and we obtain the state variation for local variables array.
Thus instrb(Q′) = υ(instrb(Q), instrb(Q, Γ), β).
Case: b = areturn
From the operational semantics of areturn (Figure 3), we have
Q = ((i, ρ, v :: s) :: (i0, ρ0, s0) :: fr, G)
instrb(Q) = ((i0 + 1, ρ0, v :: s0) :: fr, G).
From the abstract rule of areturn:
Q = (ρ, u :: s, G)
instrb(Q) = (ζ, u, G).
Let Q′ be the state variation and
Q′ = υ(Q, Q, β) = ((i, ρ′, v′ :: s′) :: (i0, ρ0, s0) :: fr, G
′)
instrb(Q
′) = ((i0 + 1, ρ0, v
′ :: s0) :: fr, G
′).
Since instrb(Q).ρ = ζ, instrb(Q) = υ(instrb(Q′), instrb(Q), β) if v′ = υ(v, u, β)
and G = υ(G′, G, β). By hypothesis, Q′ = υ(Q, Q, β) and thus the two relations
required hold.
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